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CHAP'l'ER I 
THE FUR rr'RADE AND THE FRONTIKR SOCIETY 
The best known and otten-debated doctrine of American history 
was enunciated by Frederick Jackson Turner. Turner, in an attempt 
to analyze the effect of America's move westward upon social and 
political growth, delineated certain clear steps of the advancing 
American frontier. One of these steps involved the role of the 
fur trade and traders upon the civilization and settlement of the 
/1' 
Old Northwest. ~iTurner tound that in the Northwest " • • • the 
j'" , 
trading posts became the nuclei 
traders' trails grew into early 
of larger set tlement. ; the .. ~ 
roads, and their portages marked 
out the location for canals. Little by little the tur trade was 
undermining the Indian society and paving the way for the entrance 
of civilization."l Turner also realized that the fur trader hin-
dered the advancement of the frontier. The traders had a vested 
• ! 
interest in sustaining frontier conditions, he said, since the ;': j! 
/ 
end ot the frontier also would signal the end of the fur trad •• 
Nevertheless, by exploring the new country and introducing goods 
to the Indians, the trader initiated frontier Change.~ 
.,It<#.? 
Since Turner's period of productive writing in American 
history, there has been anything but a unanimity of opinion on the 
role of the fur trade. Paul C. Phillips, who wrote the supposedly 
definitive work on the fur trade in American history, stated his 
position quite clearly: "The attractive hypotheSis of Frederick 
Jackson Turner offered no guide. Fur traders and trappers had no 
2 
interest in the settlement of land and pioneer communities, and 
held rew political or social ideas that might influence estab-
lished communities. H3 An historian of the far western fur trade, 
however, agreed with Turner. Clarence Vandiveer found that the 
advance of settlement followed directly in the paths marked out by 
the fur traders. Quite correctly, Vandiveer claimed that a great 
h~ber of our cities began their existence as fur trade posts.4 
Many historians have been content to say that cities began 
their lives as fur trade posts never considering the implications 
of such a generalization. In approximately a twenty year period, 
1815-1835, the whole economic and social structure of the Old 
Northwest was altered from a fur trade or frontier society to an 
emerging urban community. What was the nature of this changing 
frontier society? What contributions did the fur trade and fur 
traders make to frontier development? This thesis narrows the 
consideration of the fur trade to Chicago, Milwaukee, and Green 
Bay. Beginning in 1815, when the fur trade knew its wealthiest 
years, and ending in 1838, when the vanguard of a new civilization 
arrived to exploit the land and commert~ial potential of these 
midwestern areas, this study focuses on the transitional period 
of the American fur trade. 
Attempting to discover the nature of the fur trade society 
includes many elements which constituted the early history of the 
Northwest Territory. The role of the military, the Indians, the 
government factory system, and the communities of early inhabi-
/ 
3 
tnnts Are nIl intimntely oonnectnd with the fur trade. 
The 1"!lilitnrJ"s role in the advancement of the frontier has 
1>een the sUb1ect of sevo:r-nl detc.iled studies. 5 Dne au.thor has 
.. 
~:n,'T',mar:tzed tho contribution of the mili tnry as providing the 
(ttmosphero or socuri ty so thnt settlers could occupy the ceded and 
6 
the unceded lands o.f the Indtans. Tiw military post lUte the .fur 
trnde ~ost nrovided a focal Doint for settleMent on the rapidly 
expanding frontier. The military, in this study, assumes the ~ole 
of a prota~onist. Military posts established at Green Bay and 
Chicago did not noticeably increa.se the economic or aocial stabil-
ity ot the fur trade. 
The national government realized that the potential great-
neas of the frontier necessitated more than military control. 
The Indians's supposed savagery 8S well as his natural title to 
the .fertile lands o.f the Northwest required a two-sided policy. 
On the one hend, the government wished to advance the civilizing 
process of its rod brothers While, at the same time, extinguishing 
their title to the land needed for the white settlers. Arriving 
on the frontier to admi~ister this two~sided policy were the 
Indian agents. The Indian agents were commissioned to arrange 
treaties for the ss.le of land, to distribute presents to the 
Indians, and, in general. to act as a stabilizing int"luence be-
tween white and Indian.7 Perhaps their most important duty vas 
in regulating the trade of' white inhabitants with the Indians. 
Since the earliest history of the country, French and British 
4 
traders had bartered, boueht, and stolen the rich harvest of turs 
obtained by the Indians. The Indian agents were not to prohibit 
this trade but merely to foster its proper oonduct. This again 
represented only onf:) aspect of United dtates Indian polic,- - that 
ai.de which sought to protect the Indians while simultaneously 
aiding the fur trader and whtte settler. 
To advance the civilization of the Indians. anothar aspect 
of United States Indian policy was also pursued. In 1795, the 
government inaugurated the tactory system to regulate trade with 
the Indians. Its most distinguished aim was admittedly humani-
tarian, tor the factory was a government store established on the 
frontier to bu,- the Indian's furs at fair prices. In return, the 
government tactor would supply the Indians with usetul commodities 
8 
at cost. The factory vas not established to bring profits but 
to end the exploitation and gradual improverishment of the 
Indians. Yet the factor,- system provided the context for bitter 
debates snd arguments during the frontier period. The factory 
was greeted with contempt by the original inhabitants. 'nlese 
people obtained their erJono:mic Ii velih.)od f.rom the fur trade, and 
the tactory was established to capture the Indian tr~lde fI'om their 
supposedly unscrupulous hands. The factory system and its area 
head, the government factor, were also in conflict with the mili-
tary commanders and Indian agents. While the government factor 
attempted to capture the Ind.ianls furs, the Indian ar:ent was 
,. 
dispensing licenses for white traders. In effect, the government 
factor and the Indian E:gent were in direct opposition. The 
factory system eventually collapsed in 1822, due partially to 
9 
"'"rontier hostility and the inconsistent policy of' tho governm(;nt. 
The original French end British inhabitants were essential 
ingredients of the frontier community. These settlers of froIltier 
comMunities such a~ Chicago, Milwaukee, and Green Day were not 
A1'I'lerio.Eins nor before the War of 1812 had they any connt:c tion with 
the Amerioan government. Before the War of 1812, the Northvest 
Territory was still partially under British control. The majority 
of inhabitants were of British end French extraction, loyal to the 
10 British government. Their pattern of life was in many respects 
idyllic. Enduring hardships during the winter months in obtaining 
furs, the sunmler was spent in carefree and lighthe&rted enjoyment 
of life. Their society was interdepen<!~I.l:~. Most families inter-
~~~."~ ___ ,. 0--'-""·_'-'" ., ___ ""_ 
married among themselves and with the Indians. This society under· 
went B rapid change during the years covered by this study. By 
1835, the frontier outpost was changed entirely. The arrival ot 
oommeroial and farming immigrants from the East bore witness to 
the ps.ssage of the fur tr'ade society. Tr.lis change began in 1815. 
The most potent force in the changing fr()nti(!r~o!lllnunitl ~,~.s 
the Ame~~c,ElEI. r'uz,- Com~,!I.~Y. Before l8lS, the fur trade of the 
Northwest Territory had teen exploited by both American and Britis} 
citizens with only the small capital investments at the individual 
traders and a few Canadian firms. John J. Astor, however, beoame 
the first of Amerioa's giant capitalists. He realized the 
6 
enormous profits which the fur trE,de beld for a centrelly organ-
ized compEiny. In 1811, Astor entered into Ii partnership with t.wo 
f.ri tlsh companies which supplit,d goods to mt;l')Y traders of the 
rortbwest. vlben tbe territory WflS flnelly desi~nE',t.ed an Am(~rican 
pc'ssesslon efter tr ... e Conventiln or 181e, Astor forrned the Amc!r-
ieEm Fur Company to exploit the trade of this erea. Through the 
direction of Astor's two chief &gents, Hemsny Crooks find Robert 
Stuart, the American Fur Company became the focal point of the fur 
trade community for nearly twenty years. 
CHAPTER II 
FRONTIER SOCIETY IN CHICAGO, MILWAuK~~, AND GREEN dAt, 1815-1817 
The War of 1812 brought considerable hardship to the young 
society at Caicago. Before the War and the terrible Dearborn 
Massacre, the population of Chioago oonsisted mainly of the 
mi1ita~y personnel at Fort Dearborn and a few orivate traders, 
the most successful of whom was John Kinzie. During the War, the 
majority of these citizens had fled in the face of Indian attacks 
instigated by the British. In 1815, these citizens drifted back 
to the Chicago area. John Kinzie, being a leading citizen, was 
recommended for the post of Indian agent by Lewis Cass, Governor 
1 
of the Michigan 'erritory. The post was eventually given to 
Charles Jouett in 1816. The population was increased by the 
arrival of a new contingent of soldiers tor Fort Dearborn. Soon 
after, the Chicago factory was established under the direction of 
2 Jacob Varnum. The fur trade attracted the usual local traders 
as well as the Connant and Mack Company of Detroit. This company 
dispatched John Crafts with a large capital to exploit the fur 
trade of the Chicago area. 3 
Chicago was unique among the communities of this study. 
Since before the War of 1812, it had been under American influ-
ence. Even though Chicago was a small co~~unity there was a 
distinction between British and American elements. The Indians 
were clearly under British influence as evidenced by their con-
duct during the War. The principal British trader, John Kinzie, 
7 
8 
was on(; of U"~e few people whom thu InCLiar.a spareel in the Dearborn 
Mas eaCl'e • 1'h.is be t tle took the Ii '\{e s of' a. great perccnt6.ge of 
. 1- t ~ ch~cago res nen s. 
Green Bay was a much larger settlemunt than Chicago. ~hile 
Chicago had barely thirty inhabitsnts outside the military per-
I 
sonnel, Green Bay had a population of net less than 250 supported 
by two trading stores, three blacksmiths, a tailor, aue. fl carpen-
t:' 
tar.'" Unlike Chicago in the number of its population, Green Buy 
was also dissimilar in the nature of its population. There was no 
Americun influence on the Green Bay area before 1815. The Green 
Bay residents were either of British or French descent and in-
timately connected with British interests. John Lawa, Jacque 
Porlier, and the Grignon brothers, the principal citizens and fur 
f jradera, wore either born in England or raised in Canada. They 
were supplied in the fur trade by the Southwest Company of Canada 
which was represented by Robert Dickson and Jacob Franks. 
Viewed locally, the War of 1812 was fought for two reasons. 
The War attempted to end Indian treachery supposedly prompted by 
the British. Secondly, the War sought to eliminate the British 
influence over the Indian trade in the Northwest Territory.7 
~he War, therefore, was directed against the residents of Green 
Bay. lbey were British traders and had a great deal of influence 
with the Indians. To protect their interests, the Green Ba,. 
traders, under Colonel Dickson, organized the Indians of the area 
a 
to fight on the British side. Green Bay was a major depot for 
9 
s taring of :~'ri tlsh mill tal'! f.pl.pplies for the l'lorthwest during the 
War. 9 
After the War of 1812, the residents of Oreen Bey were, for 
the first time, subJectad to American influence. Fort Howard was 
erected in 1816 to protect tho citizens of the territory as well 
10 
as to control the largely British population. In lel6, John 
Bowyer assumed tho duties ot Indian agent for Green Bay. In the 
sam,e year, Matthew Irwin arrived from the Ea.st to tske charge c,t 
the new Green Bey factor,.. Unlike Chic.ego, lihic.h had a factory 
before the '-liar, this was the first attempt to regulate the Indian 
trade of the Green Eay area. The predominately British population 
resentEid the arrival of the United States mil1.tary forces and the 
factory. Despite its humanitarian aires, the factory was, in tact, 
established at Green Bay to contrel the Indian trade which meant 
reducing the profits of the Green Bay citizens. 
Milwaukee, in 1815, was the sP'ls.lles t of the three communi ties 
In tect, Milwaukee until late in the 1820's could herdly be con-
8ider~d anything but an occasiotll1.1 fur trading area. In the. ('Jarl,. 
nineteenth century nUllle:;:OU8 traders were known to have lived at 
Milwaukee such as Jea.n Beaubien, Leurent Fily, Andrew J. V1eem, 
and Joseph LaFraMboise. These traders occupied MilwaUkee during 
the trading season While durin€: the summer months the arefl WEtS 
vacant. i1 S •• omon JUlleau and Andrew J. Vieau, two of the roost 
prominent traders of this area, firat traded at; tUlwElukEle in 1818 
12 
while maintaining their permanent residence in Green Bay. 
10 
were ac justiTlF to post-war concH ti ens, John Jacob Astor formu-
] !lted the policies and ol"gani.zatlon of the A-lJerlcan Fur CC!'1ptony. 
In le11, Astc-r had conclnded an ngreement with tl(O British com-
rAnies for tho trade of the Northwest Territory. This 9gree-nent 
\In.s to lest for rl~Te years or tmtll su.ch time as the American 
govcrmr.ent prohibited Eri tish trs,ders from the Northwf'>st Terri-
tory.13 When, on April 29, 1816, the United States government 
pessed a law probibi ting forei€mers from the Illdian trade, Astor 
took sole possession of the trade. 14 Tn 1817, he officially 
pu~ehased the Canadian share of the Southwest Company in which 
he had been a partner. Astor did not immediately intervene l.n 
the Indian trade of the Northwest. bu.t he maintained the fecede 
of the Southwest Company since it hed .for many years sustained 
er.ce11ent rel&tlons with the British trsders in A1'I"ericfl.n terrl-
tory.15 
From 181$-1818, Astor orp:flnized the ac:lmin1.strfltive aspects 
of the new American Fur Company. Robert. Stuart and RamSEY Crooks 
were employed to mane.fe the bus iness op-er&.tions. Headquarters 
were est.ablished at Mackinac for the collection of furs end the 
disbursement of goods to the various traders in the interior. 
From Mackinac, outfi te, or the lupply of goods for a pert'.culflr 
post, were 8.aaembled an.d then loeded into boats celled !>!I~tteaua 
for tr&nsfer to the traders in the interior. The goods COMpiled 
for the trade consisted of everything from English playing carda 
11 
to tomahawks. Silk, gloves, broaches, and wrist bands were ex-
changed for the pelts of raccoon, mink, otter, bear, martin, red 
16 fox, deer, and muskrat. The amount of business transacted tor 
any type ot tur was usually governed by the prices in the markets 
of the United States and foreign countries. This information was 
regularly communicated to the traders from Mackinac or the New 
York office.17 
Traders with the Company were employed in different capaci-
ties and paid not only for the skill of the task but also for 
their knowledge of the Indians. Clerks and boatmen received from 
$1$0 to $200 per year. In 1821, Gurdon Hubbard, a prominent 
Chicago trader, received $12$ for his services as a clerk.18 The 
more important traders who headed an entire territory, such as 
Jean Beaubien and John Cratts of Chicago, received trom $800 to 
$1000 per year. Most traders hoped for a salary since it guaran-
teed them against personal losses trom the trade. Salaried in-
dividuals were rare, however, in the American Fur Company. Two 
alternative methods of compensation were introduced. The tirst 
ot these methods was to supply independent traders with goods at 
slightly higher prices. These traders then could sell the furs 
19 they collected to whomever they wished. For a long while, the 
Green Bay traders operated on this scheme. Finally, the traders 
could share the profits and loases of the trade with the Company. 
These men would either receive one-halt the profits of their out-
20 
tit or sutfer one-half the losses. Eventually, the Chicago 
12 
outfit operated on this scheme. The American Fur Company pre-
erred its traders to work on the profit-sharing scheme since any 
losses sustained would not be completely borne by the Company. 
Since the trade wa. malnly conducted with the Indians. tbe_ 
connections of the traders with the Indian population were espe-
ciall.y imp0I"~~_~.t. The Chicago area was inhabited by the Fox. 
Potawatomi, and Ottawa tribes. Alexander Robinson and Billy 
aldwell, who lived in the settlement at Chicago, were half-breed 
Indians acceptable to both the white and Indian populations. 2l 
uch ties were essential for the successful prosecution 01' the 
Indian trade. The Green Bay region, on the other hand, was 
ccupied by the Menominee and Wisconsin River Winnebago. Milwauke 
as a mixed village of Potawatomi and Menominee. The Green Bay 
traders, who controlled both these areas, had married into the 
tribes. Leading traders, Buch as ~acques Porlier and Augustin 
22 
rignon, had Indian wives. Thus t~e Indians placed a good deal 
l' trust In these traders and.tlleir goods. 
The idyllic prosecution of the early Indian trade soon came 
to an._end. Astor brought a large capital and the harsh business 
ractices of an organized company to the tur trade. Astor was 
uthless in his takeover 01' a trading territory. He handled com-
etitors in two basic ways. First, the independent trader was 
forced out of business by cut-throat practices, such as price 
ars, or political pressures on national or local officials. 
stor also offered an opposing trader employment in the American 
13 
23 Fur Company either by salary or profi t-snd-loss. HWi t~._ a l_arge 
cs.pit.lll" 8:n<i. extensive organization, the American Fur Company 
graduall¥ .. monopoliz.e!i ,the entire trade. 
CHAPTER III 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE AMERICAN FUR COMPANY, 1816-1821 
Astor's consolidation of the Northwest Territory for his fur 
company experienced its first success within the Chicago area. 
In addition to the Canadian firms whioh he had bought out, Astor 
had to contend with a great number of smaller fur companies which 
were looated in Detroit but supplied traders throughout the terri-
tory.1 Astor did not attempt to purchase the interests of these 
companies as he did with the British companies; but, rather, he 
applied competitive business operations within their territory. 
In 1816, the Connant and Mack Company of Detroit controlled the 
trade around the ChicaiO area. John Crafts was their principal 
agent, and his only known competition was the local trader, John 
Kinzie. 2 By 1817, however, John Kinzie was employed by the 
American Fur Company to provide serious competition for Crafts. 
In 1817, Ramsay Crooks, who directed the American Fur Company's 
operations from Mackinac, reported that John Kinzie had been very 
3 fortunate in his trade despite ,the competition of John Crafts. 
Since civilization and its aoc:~mpanling exploitation of the 
1all~ ~!ltural11 caused,a depletion of animal life, tlle fur tra9.!, 
was actually conducted some distance from the settlement at 
Shlotio.. For this reason, the American Fur Company supplied two 
outfits for the trade of this area. John Kinzie traded in the 
~ediate neighborhood of Chicago, the Rock River territory, and 
the Fox River area. Furthermore, the American Fur Company sought 
14 
15 
to drive competition away by establishing the Illinois outfit 
which traded along the Illinois River.4 While the Chicago outfit 
was supplied by shipments of goods from Mackinac, the Illinois 
outfit was dispatched from Mackinac with its supply of goods. 
Antoine Deschamps, the head of the Illinois outfit, travelled 
down the east side of Lake Michigan around to Chicago. After 
leaving Ohicago, the boats portaged to the Illinois River. 5 The 
traders were then assigned to small posts with clearly defined 
territories along the river. The men would remain in these posts 
all winter trading with the Indians and await the return of Antoin 
Deschamps, who would pick up the individual traders at their posts 
for the return voyage to Mackinac. 
Ramsay Crooks was dissatisfied with the trade ot the Chicago 
area in 1818-1819. Connant and Mack operated a post there under 
John Crafts. In 1819, the American Fur Company transferred Jean 
Beaubien from Milwaukee to Chicago to provide increased competi-
tion for John Crafts. By 1822, Beaubien with the aid of John 
Kinzie, had successfully captured the trade from John Crafts. 
Rather than compete with the American Fur Company, Crafts resigned 
from the Connant and Mack firm to accept employment with Astor's 
company.6 
Besides the competition of organized trading firms, the 
American Fur Company had to contend with numerous private and 
independent traders who were well-known in the territory. Jean 
7 Chandonnais was an independent trader in the Chicago area. 
16 
Ramsay Crooks decided to hire the man rather than compete with 
8 
him. This proved an unwise decision, since by 1819 Chandonnais 
had fallen into debt to the Company loudly proclaiming his Inten-
9 tion not to pay. 
The Illinois outfit was also bothered by competing traders. 
Gurdon Hubbard, a clerk with this outfit, was hindered for some 
time by Antoine Bourbonais. In 1822, Bourbonais operated from 
St. Louis. Traders from this area provided a major obstacle to 
the capture of the trade by the American Fur Company. Astor 
silenced theae traders by purchasing the business of his St. 
Louis rival, Cabanne, Berthold and Company.10 
The American Fur Company in 1817-1818 also began to move 
into the Milwaukee area. About the time Jean Beaubien was moved 
from Milwaukee to Chicago to oppose John Crafts, Solomon Juneau 
was given ch~rge of the Milwaukee post.l1 Juneau operated on a 
profit-sharing scheme with the Company while James Kinzie, the 
son of John Kinzie, was hired to work on a salary basis in the 
12 
same area. By 1819, Juneau and Kinzie were opposed by the 
private trader, Andrew J. Vieau. 13 
Once Beaubien had forced Crafts out of tiuainess in Chicago, 
he went back to Milwaukee to resume the trkde.' He was then quite 
surprised to find his former territory occupied by two Company 
traders, Juneau and James Kinzie. BeaUbien, disgusted with these 
tactics of the Company, decided to forsake his employment with 
the American Fur Company and join with other private traders to 
17 
force Juneau and Kinzie from the area. Ramsay Crooks took a 
rather dim view of Beaubien's intention to oppose the Company. 
Crooks assured Beaubien that he could still obtain an adequate 
living in the employment of the Company. Furthermore, Crooka 
warned Beaubien that "We (the Company) by no means intend to 
interfere with your arrangements 80 far as you are individually 
concerned, but we oertain1y will think it bad that you aasist 
others to annoy ua • • • • "14 
Astor encountered different problema in expanding the Ameri-
can Pur Company into the Green Bay area. Green Bay was one of the 
first areas where national legislation and the American Fur Com-
pany's influence in Washington had a definite etfect on the oondu*1 
of the fur trade. The national government was forced to follow a 
strict policy in Green Bay for several reasons. First, G ... n Bay 
had been a comparatively large settlement since the eighteenth 
oentury and had been predominately loyal to the British.Seoondly, 
Green Bay had never been exposed to American inf1uenoe before the 
rwar of 1812 with the typioa1 Amerioan frontier establishments 
suoh as a military fort, government factory, and Indian agent. 
~hird1y, the Green Bay area had b.en the center of British hos-
~i1ity to the United States during the War. These faotors 
~ecessitated action by the United States government to seoure the 
~rea from British control. 
As early as June 20, 181S, Governor Lewis Cas8 of the 
~ichigan Territory had recommended the establishment of military 
18 
posts at both Chicago and Green Bay primarily to prohibit the 
flood of British traders and goods into American Territory. He 
mentioned especially that British traders brought goods to Green 
Bay and then util1tized the connections with the Fox and Wisconsin 
. 15 
Rivers to distribute them throughout the territory. Credence 
wss added to Governor Cass's statement by General Brown, military 
commander of the Northern division of Military Departments in the 
United States. General Brown commented that British influence 
was so strong throughout the Northwest Territory that the only 
etfective measure would be a 'wholesale exclusion of the British 
16 
from the Indian trade. Governor Edwards of the Illinois terri-
tory Made strong accusations against the Green Bay traders. In 
1816, Governor Edwards said that the citizens and traders of the 
Green Bay area were wholly British in sympathy; and, theretore, 
he recoJ1'Ul'lended to James Monroe, Secretary of State, that these 
inhabitants should be removed from the territory. To replace the 
void the exclusion of these original Green Bay inhab!.tants would 
cause, Edwards recommended that "it ~ight be advisable • • • to 
permit their places to be supplied, by good American citizens, 
for the purpose of affording accommodations to our garrison, to 
our traders, and to the Indians themselves. n17 
Beside. the recommendations of national and state otficials 
that actions should be taken to exclude British influence trom 
the Northwest Territory, a strong complaint against their 
presence also came trom the American Fur Company. To successfully 
19 
prosecute the Indian trade, Astor had to completely eliminate 
the British influence. Because the Chicago area had been under 
American influence before the War of 1812, Astor did not face 
sustained British competition in that area. The situation in 
Green Bay was quite different. The Green Bay traders for nearly a 
half century had been associated with Canadian firms such as the 
Southwest Company and Forsyth, Richardson and Company. After the 
War an American firm in Detroit, Stone, Bostwick and Company, 
reached the territory betore Astor. Stone hired Jacob Franks, a 
British citizen, who had been the liaison man between the Green 
Bay traders and the Canadian firm, the Southwest Company. Because 
their trusted friend, Jacob Franks, was employed by Stone, 
Bostwick and Oompany, most of the Green 8a7 traders dealt with 
18 this companr. Because Astor could not obtain the services ot 
British traders such as those at Green Bay, he also wished to see 
British interests excluded trom the American trade. -Ir-!stor 
--, .. --~.-
could rid himselt of the Green Bay traders, h4i c()~~8Jmg.J~.:1. own 
men to that area. 
The recommendations ot both Astor and state ofticials led a 
Oongressional committee to investigate the problem. The Congress 
acted immediately and passed a law which struck hard at the 
British interests in the Indian trade: 
Licenses to trade with the Indians within the terri-
torial boundaries of the United States shall not be 
granted to any but citizens ot the United States, 
unless by the express direction ot the President ot 
the United States, and upon such terms and conditions 
20 
as the public interest may in his opinion require ••• " 
The law also prescribed penalties of forteiture, fine, and im-
prisonment for any foreigner introducing merchandise ~nto the 
India,!l~,country or entering the Indian terri tory without a pass-
19\ port!// 
Astor was not pleased with the law. He wished to exclude 
British capital from, the trade, but he did not wish to end the 
possibility of his using British traders. In other words, Astor 
would have liked to sever the connection between the Gr.en Bay 
traders and their former British liaison man, Jacob Franks. In 
this way, Astor thought he could better persuade the Green Bay 
people to join his firm. In a letter to James Monroe, Secretary 
of State, Astor said that he could not operate a successtul fur 
business without the aid ot Canadian traders since United States 
citizens had neither the stamina nor the skill to become effective 
traders. Therefore, Astor asked that he be allowed to issue 
20 licenses at his own discretion. Even betore Astor's letter was 
received, the President decided that the power to grant licenses 
should be vested in the Governor ot the Michigan Territory and the 
agents for Indian affairs at Michilimackinac, Green Bay, and 
21 Chicago. This directive benefited the American Fur Company. 
Now the power to grant licenses rested with people in the actual 
trading areas where Astor's agents could exert an extraordinary 
amount of pressure upon local officials to obtain licenses for 
specific British traders. 
21 
Tho law of 1816 was immediately revised. The United Statel 
government did not follow the harsh recommendations of Hinian 
Edw&rds and General Brown who had suggested the total exclusion pf 
foreigners fram the territory. Instead, the government followe, 
Ast,:>r's view of the value of British participation in the trade 
as evidenced by the following official statement by William H. 
Crawford; Secretary of War: 
It is therefore wholly improbable that the 
enterprise of American citizens will furnish an 
adequate supply to those remote tribes. The want 
of capital in the hands of men accustomed to the 
trade, and who have enterprise to bear the fatigues, 
and brave the dangers incident to its prosecution 
will it is believed render it necessary for the 
present to permit foreigners to carryon this trade 
under such regulations as shall subject them to a 22 
strict observance of the laws of the United States. 
Therefore, the law of 1816 prohibiting foreigners from the 
trade was relaxed under proper regulation. New regulations re-
quired an applicant for a trading license, whether he was a 
British or American citiZen, to be of trustworthy character 
(decided by the Indian agent) and to give a bond equal to one-
fourth the capital employed. 2) 
Although the American Fur Company was friendly with many 01 
the local officials charged with dispensing lioens8s,24 it was 
at odds with )lajor William H. Puthuff, agent for Indian affairs 
at Michilimackinac, and Colonel John Bowyer, agent for Indian 
afrs.irs at Green Bay. Neither of these men appeared to have bet n 
prejudiced for or against the American Fur Company, yet they wele 
·. 
22 
staunchly opposed to any admission of British traders. Major 
Puthuf£ thought that all British traders had a political aim 
• • • to alienate the Indians from the American government and 
people, to attach them to the British interests by every and by 
25 
any of the most insidious means." Because of this opinion, 
Puthuft oonsidered the traders ot the Green Bay region, especially 
26 the Grignon brothers, the most dangerous to national unity. 
Perhaps Major Puthutt was overzealous in his desire to pro-
tect American interests, yet there was reason tor him to be sua-
picious ot the Green Bay residents. As mentioned previously, 
Green Bay was hostile to the United States during the War. Ot 
the residents at tho Bay, there were only two American oitizens. 
In addition, the Grignon brothers, John Lawe, and Jacques Porlier 
held commissions in the British army.27 Puthutt could not imagine 
such people returning to a peaoetul pursuit of the trade atter the 
War. 
Puthuff, theretore, strictly entorced the law ot 1816. In 
June, 1816, he seized the furs of Jaoques Porlier, a resident ot 
Green Bay, which were enroute to Canada in payment for goods he 
had reoeived from a Canadian firm. Puthutf based his seizure 
upon the fact that Porlier had no lioense to trade in the terri* 
28 tory. Puthuft worked an unrair hardship on many traders. ae-
tween the time the law of 1816 was promulgated, April 29, 1816, 
and the time of the seizure of Porlier's goods, Porlier would have 
had a difficult time obtaining a license. In 1818, Porlier was 
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fo~ced to write his employer, Forsyth, Richardson and Company, 
that he could not possibly pay his debts since his goods hed been 
confiscated for the past several years. Puthutt's harsh tactics 
had created hostility between the frontier citizens and their new 
~overnment. Parlier remarked that "I begin to perceive that that 
word liberty in the language ot politics or ot the government doea 
not mean the same thing as we oommonly suppose.R29 
Atter Puthutt'a initial harsh policy with regard to the 
issuing of licenses, Governor Cass was forced to instruct him on 
the real purpose at the law. Governor Cass pointed out that 
merely because a person was a foreigner did not exolude him from 
the trade. Governor Cass commented that the real question was 
" • _ • whether the person applying for a license be one who can 
30 be safely admitted to trade in the Indian oountry." 
On May 4, 1817, Governor Cass received word trom George 
Graham, Acting Secretary of War, that John Astor had embarked on 
an American enterprise, the Amerioan Fur Company, which should be 
granted every possible aid.3l Governor Cass dealt with the 
American Fur Company quite tairly_ For example, in the question 
at licensest he did not act partisanly toward the American Pur 
Company as some authors charge. 32 Cass did act harshly against 
British capital in the fur trade, but he extended every possible 
favor to American companies irregardless at whether Astor held a 
oontrolling influence. When the Green Bay traders were employed 
by the American firm of Stone, Bostwick and Company, Cass found it 
24 
necessary to once again write Major Puthutt warning him that 
strict application of the law was not always the best polioy_ 
Cass expressed the desire that Puthutt should lioense the men 
requested by Stone, Bostwick and Company_ He realized that the 
majority ot these men were still British citizens, but he was 
also aware that they were supported by American capital. There-
tore, Cass telt that M • • • when American capital and enterprise 
are embarked in this trade • • • to enoourage it by all proper 
means. n33 
Governor Cass's lenient polioy in respect to lioenses tor 
all American tur companies was detrimental to the monopolistio 
designs ot the Amerioan Fur Company. When licenses were .ifticult 
to obtain, Astor had enough national and local intluence to 
attract traders trom other oompaniea by promising them lioenses. 
The new policy ot lenien07 was also reflected in Major Puthutf'a 
attitude toward the Green Bay people. ae wrote to Indian agent 
Bowyer at Green Bay in September, 1817, concerning a license for 
John Lawe. Although Puthutf dialiked the Green Bay traders, he 
instructed Bowyer to iasue a licenae to John Lawe if his oonduct 
and deportment were goOd. 34 Colonel Bowyer, although he would 
have preferred to keep lioenses trom Lawe and the Grignons, con-
sented to the new interpretation of the law. Be prooeeded to 
lioense numerous traders. Bowyer'a lenienoy prompted Louia 
Grignon to remark that " • • • I believe there will be as many 
traders as Houses. n35 
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In January, 1818, the United States again changed the policy 
in regard to licensing ot British sUbjects. This further change 
added to the confusion on the frontier and increased the hostility 
of the Green Bay traders toward the national government. Cass 
wrote to John BOV7er that the President had again decided to com-
pletely eliminate foreigners from obtaining licenaes as traders 
or even from being employed as mere clerks under the watchful eye 
of an American citizen. 36 Ramsay Crooks and Robert Stuart immedi-
ately raised a furor over the new policy. They pointed out to 
John Astor that the majorit1 of their traders were British citi-
zens; and, without their services, the American Fur Company would 
be ruined. Crooks and Stuart asked Astor to present their case 
directly to the president,37 
American policy was again changed within the short space of 
three months because of the influence ot Stusrt, Crooks, and Astor 
upon the government. On April 2), 1818, Lewis Cass wrote to ~e 
Indian agents at Green Bay and Chicago informing them that not all 
foreigners need be excluded. Cass's explanation of this change 
sounded as if John Astor had written the letter, The inconven-
ience which American capital would sufter without the aid of the 
toreigner's superior knowledge ot the trade, Cass explained, made 
necessary certain exceptions to the law. Cass explained that the 
United States policymakers had made one unchangeable decision; 
no longer would toreigners be allowed to head a trading outtit or 
have charge ot a group ot men within the territory. The new law 
26 
only allowed foreigners to enter the territory mlder the direction 
of an American citizen as boatmen and interpreters. Theso rogu-
lations required a list of all traders entering a territory to be 
submitted to proper authorities, plus banda, not only for the 
complete out~it but also an additional $$00 bond for each foreign 
trader. The law also looked forward to the time when all for-
eigners could be excluded. It required that for every foreign 
trader hired as an interpreter, an American citizen also had to 
38 be employed to learn the duties of an interpreter. 
Even though the law was more lenient, it still worked hard-
ships on the Green Bay traders. In 1818, John Lawe claimed that 
he was cloae to financial ruin. Jacob Franks, the agent for 
Stone, Bostwick and Company dealing with the Green Bay traders, 
suggested that John Lawe arrange his trade in accordance with 
the regulations. John Lawe could hire Americans to transport his 
goods to the interior, Franks thought, while Lawe himself acted 
as interpreter even though he was really head of the outfit. 
Franks, however, warned Lawe that he should apply for citizenship 
as soon as possible.39 He further urged John Lawe to form a 
partnership with Jacques Porlier and the Grignon brothers to 
minimize their 10sses.40 
Frank's advice did not tmmediately impress itselt upon John 
Lawe. In November, 1818, Lawe wrote to Thomas G. Anderson, an 
old British comrade during the War. Lawe claimed that since the 
War he had lost nearly $800 on his property alone. Furthermore, 
27 
he had failed to obtain a license ror the coming season and 
commented that "I wish I could sellout and leave this country 
forever. n41 
John Lawe and the other Green Bay traders had not made such 
threats orrhandedly. In 1819, Lawe received a letter from Robert 
Dickson, another British army orficer, who requested him to delay 
his move to Canada until other arrangements could be made.42 
Dickson wished Lawe and his fellow Bay inhabitants to move to the 
Red River district where Lord Selkirk had purchased lands with 
the aid of the Hudson Bay Company to begin a settlement.43 
Lawe and the Grignons were never able to act on this scheme aince 
Lord Selkirk died the following year. 
With the death of Selkirk, Lawe and the other Bay traders 
decided to act upon the advice or Jacob Franks. They attempted 
to engage in the trade according to American regulations. In 
the early part of 1819, John Lawe procured a license to enter the 
territory as an interpreter. Governor Cass was quite willing to 
grant the lioense but the final deoision was up to Colonel Bowyer, 
the Indian agent at Green Bay. Cass influenced Bowyer's decision 
somewhat by reminding him that merely because Lawe was still a 
British citizen did not exclude him from the trade.44 Finally, 
the Green Bay traders recognized that the only way to realize a 
successful trade in their area was to become citizens of the 
United States. Therefore, late in 1819, John Lawe, Pierre, 
Augustin, and Charles Grignon applied tor citizenship at 
28 
Michilimackinac.45 
The efforts of the Gree~ Bay residents to obtain American 
citizenship were frustrated by the changing stipulations of the 
original Jay Treaty. Jacques Porlier, a prominent trader ot the 
Green Bay region, had been granted tentative citizenship as were 
other traders. On September j, 1819, however, the Attorney Gen-
eral ot the United States prescribed more stringent regulations 
for attaining citizenship. The Attorney General did not teel 
that mere residence in the territory constituted citizenship. 
The laws governing citizenship under the Jay Treaty, the Attorney 
General s8id, required a person to swear an oath betore a dele-
gated otflcial.46 Governor Cass, therefore, wes required to 
suspend the citiZenship of. the Green Bay residents until the 
proper oath could be administered.47 
This action was partially due to the influence of the Ameri-
can Fur Company. Before 1820, the Green Hay traders were still 
dealing with Stone, Bostwick and Company, a leading competitor 
of Astor in the territory. The Green Bay traders had resisted 
all the efforts of Astor's enterprise to gain their services. In 
1818, Ramsay Crooks personally Journeyed to Green Bay to persuade 
them to enter the American Fur Company. All the Bay traders, how-
ever. remained loyal to Jacob Franks and Stone, Bostwick and 
Company.48 Crooks and Stuart, seeing that their initial efforts 
to eliminate competition in the area had failed, decided to under-
take a different policy. In 1819, they successfully cajoled 
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fovernment otticials into suspending the tentative citizenship of 
the Green Bay traders.49 Now Crooks' and Stuart temporarily 
possessed without competition all the trading territories on the 
Fox and Wisconsin Rivers. 
Stuart realized that soon the government would be required 
to grant citizenship to the Green Bay residents. Therefore, he 
decided to act as a friend ot the Green Bay people and help them 
gain their citizenship. On October 28, 1819, Stuart expressed 
his concern over the revocation of their citizenship, but he 
mentioned that Mr. Ramsay Crooks was in Washington attempting to 
50 
secure citizenship for them. The Green Bay residents were 
tooled by Stuart's clever scheme and now agreed to deal with the 
Company. Robert Stuart then used his intluence to gain citizen-
ship and justice for the new employees. Writing to Governor 
Lewis Cass on Hovember 3. 1819, Stuart told him of the injust 
action of Indian agent Bowyer at Green Bay. BOW1er, who had 
granted licenses to Porlier, Lawe, and Pierre Grignon tor the 
coming year, had now decided to revoke them. Stuart explained 
that the traders, under the impression that they possessed 
licenses. had contracted tor trade goods and now taced tinancial 
ruin. In conclusion, Stuart urged Governor Cass that A • • • 
such oppression and inconsistency will I am convinced be speedily 
remedied by you Sir. A51 
In the interim, the Green Bay traders Skilltully avoided 
the full letter of the law. John Lawe hired a Mr. Laurance, an 
30 
~merican citizen to do his trading in the interior. 52 Ramsay 
Crooks wrote to Louis Rouse, another Green Bay trader, that 
hiring Americans to act as tronts was a dangerous policy. Crooks 
did not suggest abandoning this policy, but he did warn the 
traders to exercise extreme caution. 53 
In October and November of 1821, the Green Bay traders 
finally received notification ot their status as citizens of the 
United States.54 Even though the Green Bay residents were even-
tually confirmed as citizens, the results of the license and 
citizenship controversy seemed to have created outright hostility 
on the trontier. The unsettled and inconsistent policy ot the 
United States government toward British subjects and the Indian 
trade had eventually brought it temporary control of this frontier 
enterprise. However, the loyalty of men continually abused by a 
strange government .was certainly to be just as inconsistent. 
The American Fur Company benefited from the vaoillations of 
the government. Beoause the Amerioan Fur Company possessed. 
great deal ot influence in Washington .and on the frontier, it 
could otfer its traders advantages not found elsewhere. 
Eventually men sUQh 'as Colonel Bowyer and Major Puthutf who 
opposed the Company were removed from their posts to be replaoed 
by more pliant s,rvants.55 By helping to obtain licenses tor the 
Green Bay traders, the American Fur Company eliminated an Amer~ 
foan competitor, Stone, Bostwick and Company, from the Green Bay 
area. Thus, by 1821, the Amerioan Fur Company had driven Connant 
31 
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and Mack from Chicago, had established a post at Green Bay, and 
had gained the services of Lawe and his tellow traders. The 
inconsistent policy ot the government had driven some British 
companies out of the territory. In place ot the British, the 
government had helped to create the monopolistic control and c 
enormous national power ot the American Fur Oompany_ 
CHAPTER IV .;-
.~,I' 
THE AMERICAN FUR COMPANY AND THE 
GOVERNMENT FACTORY SYSTEM, 1816-1822 
From 1816-1822, in both Chicago and Green B~y, the organized 
fur trade under the auspices of the American Fur Company and the 
private traders was faced with an a1arminp threat to its security. 
The re-establishment of the factory system after the War ot 1812 
was designed to rid the area of British influence as well as to 
assure the Indians a decent existence from the fur trade. The 
factory intended to give the Indians a fair price for their furs, 
and thus it was a competitive institution with the regular fron-
tier trader. 
Matthew Irwin was appointed g~vernment tactor at Green Bay 
with a salary of $1000 per year. At Chicago, Jacob Varnum was 
1 the factor with a salary of only $800 per year. The differenoe 
in salary between the two factories most likely resulted from the 
more difficult task whioh faced Irwin at Green Bay. While Chicago 
had been the site of a faotory before the War., GX'een Bay was still 
a comparatively untamed area without the influence of American 
frontier institutions. 
Thomas L. McKenney, Superintendent of the Indian Trade and 
head of the factory system, was optimistio about the prospects of 
the re-established factory system. In 181$, the total amount of 
goods sent to Green Bay amounted to $15,7.38.06 while Chioago re-
2 
celved a shipment of $9,452 • .34. MoKenneyls hopes for a suooess-
.32 
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rul factory at Green Bay were quickl,. dissolved. By 1811, he 
appeared dissatisfied with the business of the Green Ba,. factor,.: 
Since you have been at Green Bay your returns have 
been ver,. much irregular and the business you have 
been doing, very limited. The whole amount of 
your sales appears to be only $538.40 and of this 
sum it would 8eem about $180 had been sold to the 
Indians. J 
Disillu.sioned by the operation of the Green Bay ractory, 
McKenney asked Irwin whether or not the business .eld any good 
prospects for the future. If the factor,. could not maintain a 
favorable trade, McKenney said, it should be closed immediately.4 
In March, 1811, Irwin explained the reasons tor the poor business 
done at the factory. The admission ot British citizens who had 
for man,. years traded in this area, Irwin claimed, robbed the 
factory or the Indian trade. Irwin accused the traders of in-
citing the hostility ot the Indians against the factory.5 
The failure of the tactory was caused by many tactors. In 
September, 1811, Irwin again wrote to Thomas L. McKenney and 
placed primary responsibility for the failure ot the factory upon 
the Indian policy or the national government. Irwin found an 
incongruity in the system ot the Indian agents and government 
factors for 
• • • the factors are sent to supply the wants of 
the Indians, and the Indian agents can adopt such 
measures as to deteat all their plans to that end. 
It i8 very certain that the authority vested in 
them to issue lioenses is well calculated to d~e~~~ 
all the benetits ~at might be expected tr ,b.eTOWE:-
factories • • • • ~~ ~~ 
"V LOYOLA 
Many times the Indian agents were friendly to the traders 
7 
and fur companies and thus directly untriendly to the tactor. 
In addition, Irvin was not merely compl.aining about British 
traders being licensed but any traders in the territory. The 
only eftective remedy tor the Green Bay tactory, Irvin claimed, 
was an absolute prohibition ot trading licenses to all traders 
when the tactory could supply the good. needed by a particular 
8 
Indian settlement. 
The inetfectiveness ot Irwin's business at the tactory was 
readily apparent in his qu~rterly returns tor May to August ot 
1817. In this period, Irwin collected turs valued at $)04.76. 
At the same time, Irwin sold mprchandise valued at $1,349.08.9 
There was a detinite discrepancy in Irvin'S accounts. It he had 
only exchanged merchandise tor turs ot approximately ~e same 
value, then the two figures should have been relatively equal. 
McKenney realized the discrepancies in the quarterly account. He 
sur.miaed that Irwin was selling goods directly to the white 
traders instead ot merely conducting a tur trade exchange tor the 
Indiana. The factory had det1n1ter·pules governing cash or credit 
sales to whites. The f •• tor could only sell goods to white 
10 
aettlers when the gooda were not req~ir.d tor the Indians. 
~ven in this caae, nevertheless, the factor was supposed to dis-
courage such transactions by charging the white settlers prices 
ten per cont above the standard. Matthew Irwin did not tollow 
these rules. In one case, be sold gunpowder at 65¢ per pound, a 
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price far below the minimum cost to the factory. McKenney ex-
pressed his dissatisfaction with Irwin's unsound business prac-
tices. A trader or white settler, McKenney said, would buy the 
powder at 65~ per pound; and, then, he would proceed to the Indian 
11 
territory to sell the powder for $1.00 per pound. Thus, Irwin 
had defeated the aims of the factory system in two ways. Firat, 
he made it impossible for the factory to operate within a speci-
fied budget. More important, Irwin sustained and encouraged 
traders to cheat the Indians, the very practice which the factory 
attempted to prohibit. 
Because of McKenney's complaints, Mat,thew Irvin decided upon 
a scheme to increase the effectiveness of the factory. Irwin 
felt that his major tasks were to gain the confidence of the 
Indians and to subsidize their trade before the private traders 
could. He decided to operate like the American Fur Company by 
dispatching agents for the factory (sub-factors) into the interior 
According to Irwin, the factory was located too far away from the 
actual trading areas to gain the Indian's business. Previous to 
Irwin's plan, the private traders had the advantage of selling 
goods to the Indians and collecting their furs before the factory 
could exert any influence. McKenney was skeptical of the whole 
idea and demanded that Irwin obtain sufficient security betore 
12 dispensing goods to a factory agent. 
The reaction of the Green Bay traders was most certainly 
hostile since Irwin had entered into their trading territories. 
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In 1821, Louis Grignon, who was trading on the Fox and Wisconsin 
Rivers, mentioned that there was increased oompetition because ot 
the men sent trom the factory. In a rather poignant statement, 
Grignon commented that " • • • for the people paid by the govern-
ment, aocording to my thought should not try to win one or 
another individual just in order to make a profit under the oover 
of care tor the savagea and ot the pretended benetits that the, 
reoeive trom the factories •••• n13 
Ramsay Crooks and Robert Stuart ot the American Pur Company 
found this policy particularly odious. According to Crooks and 
Stuart, Matthew Irwin had perverted the original intention at the 
factory system. '!'he man sent by the .t'ac,tory into the interior, 
Crooks claimed, acted just like a normal trader and attempted to 
make a profit. Because ot Irwin's plan, Crooks asserted, the 
factory was no longer a benevolent aid to unfortunate Indians, 
but it was now a government business participating in the fur 
trade. Crooks, therefore, conCluded that the government had en-
tered into the field of private enterprise, and, because ot ita 
power, was not operating on equal grounds with the local traders. 
Therefore, Crooks ~nd Stuart encouraged John Astor to speak to the 
President with the intention of gaining the abolition of the 
factory system or the reversal of Irwin's system of subwfactors.~ 
There was another side to this controversy besides that ot 
the American Fur Compahy on the practices of the tactory sTat.-. 
Since the inauguration of the factory, Major Irwin had complained 
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about British influence in the trade. Irwin felt the contradic-
tion of American governmental policy. Although laws had been 
passed to reduce British influence in the trade, Irwin stated 
that this was only a partial answer. The American Fur Company, 
he stated, had been considered an American firm by the government 
when, in actual tact, it was run by British citizens.1S To 
Irwin, the license law was inettective because it was not pri -
marily aimed at the traders of the American Fur Company. Irwin 
realized that the American Fur Company and the tactory were two 
competing organizations. 
The American Fur Company tound the tactory a tiresome 
nuisance to its attempt to gain a monopoly of the tur trade. They 
deliberately reduced the price of their goods to undersell the 
16 tactory. Yet the Company held an even more lmportant advantage 
over the factory--polltical control. Both Major Puthutt at 
Mackinac and Colonel Bowyer at Green Bay, who had refused to 
accede to the Company's demands tor 11censes, were eventually re-
moved trom ottlce under the requests ot Robert Stuart and Ramsay 
Crooks. Crooks held such influenoe with Lewis Cass that, even 
though he was a Brltish citizen, he was commi8sioned to journey to 
Prairie du Chien to- examine the conduct ot the Indian agent at 
17 that place. Through the reports ot his factors, McKenney vas 
aware of the tactios ot Astorts 'irm. MoKenneyts strongest oom-
plaint was against the practice ot the Company hiring all the 
traders in a particular area, whether needed or not, merely to 
38 
keep the factory from obtaining needed manpower for duties such 
18 
as interpreters and clerks. 
In 1820, Irwin felt he had definite proof concerning the 
hostile intentions and influence of the British traders employed 
or connected with the American Fur Company. Irwin said that a 
Mr. Armitinger, an independent trader, went to the neighborhood 
of Lake Winnebago and was fired upon by the Indians. The same 
incident occurred when Captain Whistler from Fort Howard entered 
the area. Yet when Jacques Porlier and Louis Grignon, employees 
of the American Fur Company, approached this area, they were un-
molested and reaped a large amount of furs from the Indians. In 
sum, Irwin felt that these facts proved the hostility which the 
British traders and the American Fur Company were erecting be-
19 tween the American and Indian population. 
Jacob Varnum in Chicago also complained of British traders 
disrupting his trade. Varnum encountered a difterent situation 
at Chicago. For the first two years, 1816-1818, the Chicago fac-
tory experienced a limited degree ot success. Early in 1817, 
McKenney recommended that Jacob Varnum receive a raise in salary 
because ot the increase in the volume of trade at the Chicago 
20 
factory. Varnum's salary was raised trom $800 to $1000 per year. 
From the inception of the Chicago tactory in 1816 to March 31, 
1818, the factory gained $2253 in the trade. The expense of 
running the establishment, however, amounted to $4093. Despite a 
total loss ot $2000, the Chicago factory was more successful than 
. 21 
the faotory at Green Bay. 
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There are several explanations for the greater suocess of the 
Chicago factory. The most probable reason was the influence which 
the Chicago factory exerted before the War of 1812. The Indians 
had faith in the Chicago factory while the independent traders 
were still disorganized due to the War. The Chicago factory, 
from 1816-1818, provided the only outlet for furs and the purchase 
of merohandise. By 1818, however, the American Fur Company pur-
sued the fur trade in the area. It had forced John Crafts out of 
businesl, and certainly the Chicago factory must have begun to 
teel the oompetition of the Ameridan Pur Company. 
In December, 1818, Jaoob Varnum, 8S Matthew Irwin had done, 
previously, remonstrated against the large nwpbers of traders in-
filtrating into the Chicago area. Varnum said that 
The indiscriminate admission ot British subjects 
to trade with the Indians, is a matter ot pretty 
general complaint throughout this seotion of the 
country_ There are tive establishments within 
limits of this agenoy headed by British subjects.22 
These establishments, to which Varnum referred, most likely were 
the American Fur Company's posts along the Illinois River headed 
by Antoine Deschamps and the Chicago headquarters under Jean 
Beaubien. 
The factories both at Chicago and Green Bay, however, re-
o~ived their staunchest opposition not so much from the British 
traders themselves as from the goods they traded. The private 
trader effectively distributed whiskey to the Indians, and in this 
40 
lay one of the chief causes for the poor business of the factories 
Liquor sales to the Indians had been a problem on the earliest 
frontiers of America. In 1802, the Congress had passed a law 
~uthorizing the President to take such measures as appeared 
proper" ••• to prevent or restrain the vending or distribution 
of spiritou8 liquors among all or any of the Indian tribes."23 
Yet this law did not actually prevent the use of liquor. In 1816, 
Governor Ninian Edwards of the Illinois Territory attempted to 
rectify the situation by obtaining passage or a territorial law 
which forbade the sale or liquor to the Indians and provided 
penalties for such action.24 lbe Green Bay traders were promptly 
25 
informed of the new law and the penalties attached. Yet they 
found the law both impractical and impossible for officials to 
enforce: 
You will notice, Sir, that liquor having once been 
allowed among the savages it is not possible to 
restrain them from it, and that moreover there is 26 
not force enough here to sustain such a regulation. 
Knowing that the law would be impossible to enforce, the 
traders carefully avoided the spirit of the law. The law only 
forbade the sale of liquor to the Indians so that the traders, 
before going into the territory, would claim that any liquor in 
their packs was merely for private use. 27 The law did not ban 
liquor from the Indian lands, and thus a large quantity was 
always kept by the traders themselves and at their depot at Green 
Bay. John Bowyer, the Indian aFent at Green Bay, attempted to 
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ban the, storing of liquor at Green Bay, but Governor Cass intormed 
28 
him that such action, although desirable, would be illegal. 
Many times Irvin complained bitterly of the use of liquor in 
the Indian trade which induced the Indians to become intoxicated 
and to sell their furs at poor prices. Irwin explained why it 
was impossible to prosecute traders for selling liquor illegally 
to the Indians: 
A return to reason vill induce many ot them (the 
Indians) to mention vho sold them the whiskey •. 
but it is deemed illegal to accept Indian testi-
mony, so that the British and American traders • 
may deal in w~9skey without the smallest chance 
of detection. 
• • 
Although the American Fur Company vas not in full control of 
the territory betore 1822, it was involved in the whiskey trade. 
In actual fact, the American Fur Company would have preferred not 
to deal in liquor. Liquor was an expensive oommodity tor a 
trading outtit. In addition, liquor destroyed the Indian's de-
sire and ability to hunt. These oonsiderations have led 80me 
authors to surmise that the Amerioan Fur Company retrained trom 
the use of whiskey in the trade betore 1822. 30 In the Company'. 
Account Book. for 1821, however, the following items were shipped 
to Green Bay and Chicago: 418 gallons of High Wine, 30 gallons 
or Jamaioa Spirits, 8 gallons ot Cognac Brandy, and 35 gallons or 
31 Rio Wine. 
A more damaging example ot the American Fur Company'. conneo-
tion with the whiskey trade ocourred in 1821. At this time, Dr. 
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Alexander Wolcott, the Chicago Indian agent, refused to grant 
James Kinzie a trading license for the Milwaukee area. Wolcott 
was informed by Matthew Irwin that Kinzie was suspected of having 
sold liquor to the Iridians. 32 Irwin had probably told Wolcott ot 
the incident so that Kinzie could not obtain a trading licen.e 
for the Chicago area. Ram.ay Crook., with whom Kinzie was em-
ployed, detested the actions ot Indian agent Wolcott. Wolcott, 
Crooks said, refused to grant Jame. Kinzie a licen.e on mere 
suspicion. To correct such an injustioe to his agent, Crooks 
obtained a lioense for Kinzie trom Colonel Boyd at Mackinac. Yet 
Crooks warned Kinzie that his oonduct now had to be above re-
proach. 33 Crooks's ability to obtain a license fram Colonel Boyd, 
despite the objections of Wolcott and Irwin, was typical ot the 
enormous power of the American Fur Company. Colonel Bo~, who 
issued the license to Kinzie, had been Crooks's choice tor Indian 
agent to replace the recalcitrant Major Puthutf. In 1818, Gov-
ernor Cas8, realizing the problems caused by an agent licensing a 
trader in Mackinac tor trade in the Chicago area, had outlawed 
such procedures without the con.ent ot both agents concerned.34 
Despite the action of Boyd, then, Wolcott ordered Kinzie to olose 
his trading outfit within sixty days and leave the territory. 
Irwin realized that the absence of Kinzie trom the Milwaukee are. 
would leave the Indians without a trader, and he was more than 
happy to enter this country controlled by the American Fur Company 
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Irwin, therefore, oommissioned Jacques Vieau as an agent of the 
Green Bay factory. Vieau was an American citizen; and, aocording 
to Irwin, he was of impeccable character. Irwin gave him goods 
amounting to $2,228.25 with which to deal with the Indians. 35 
McKenney, the Superintendent of the Indian Trade, did not 
allow this inoident concerning Kinzie to go unnoticed. On Deo-
ember 7, 1821, he strongly oriticized the Amerioan Fur Company in 
the Daily National Intelligencer with the oase of James Kinzie as 
an example. The people now knew, he aaid, the identity of n . , 
• these invisible nobodies ••• dealers in whiskey. furs, and 
Indian blood ••• agents of this same American Fur Company,ft36 
Crooks and Stuart were hardly pleased over the Kinzie affair, 
In 1821, Stuart accused Irwin of exaggerating the case against 
Kinzie in ord~r to improve the national image ot his factory. 
Stuart predicted that, despite Irwin'S attempts, the factory 
system would be abolished within a year. 37 By 1822, Stuart had 
changed the tone of his critioism because of the public reaction 
to the Kinzie affair. Now he found Kinzie a less than reputable 
character and considered relieving him ot his position with the 
Company. 38 Finally, in April, 1822, Stuart told Kinzie to leave 
the Milwaukee area to another trader and return to Chicago. 39 
Stuart then attempted to aave the name of the American Fur 
Company by completely disclaiming any knowledge ot Kinzie's 
activities. Stuart quite bluntly told Governor Cass that • • • • 
whenever any person either employed by, or having dealing8 ot 
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wha te'~rer ns ture with us does not conform to the laws • • • gov-
erning the trade • • • we will always be willing and happy to 
have them entirely excluded from the country." Stuart actually 
suggested that Kinzie be e%pelled from the territory. The only 
reason the Oompany had been reluctant to act, Stuart explained, 
was because James Kinzie was the son or John Kinzie, an inportant 
40 trader of the Chicago area. Whether or not the American Pur 
Company was aware of Kinzie's activities in selling liquo~ to the 
Indians can not be definitely proven, but the large shipments or 
liquor made by the Company throughout the period indicate that the 
Company made use of liquor whenever needed. 
James Kinzie ignored the actions of Dr. Wolcott and the 
advice of Robert Stuart and remained in the Milwaukee area. As 
late as July, 1822, Kinzie va. peddling liquor to the Indians.41 
To prevent his continuing illegal conduct, Alexander Wolcott vrote 
to George Boyd, the Indian agent at Mackinac, to inform him of 
Kinzie's activities. Wolcott warned Boyd against issuing Kinzie 
e license for the coming year. Finally, Wolcott sent a marshal 
to apprehend Kinzie and make an example or his illegal conduct.42 
Tpe real erfect of Kinzie's activities and those of many 
unscrupulous traders in the peddling of whiskey were clearly 
evident in the Congressional investigation and the eventual re-
port of Reverend Jedidiah Morse. In 1818, the House of Represen-
tatives had requested Secretary of War Calhoun to report OIl the 
feasibility of instituting a new plan for the conduet of the 
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Indian trade. Calhoun immediately wrote to the men connected. with 
the system inviting them to oomment on the best method ot abol-
ishing the ourrent system and instituting a new organization. 
T. L. MoKenney was the tirst.to reply to Calhoun's inquiries. In 
MoKenney's opinion, the abolishing ot the tactories oould only 
bring harm to the Indians at the expense ot aiding individual 
enterprise.43 Levis Cass,on the other hand, was decidedly in 
favor of a new system tor the Indian trade. Sinoe Amerioan 
private enterprise was now capable ot conduoting the Indian trade, 
Cass claimed, the government should wlthdraw. Cass's only rec~ 
mend.tion was to erect stringent trade laws against liquor which 
then would place the trader. and the Indians on equal footing in 
the conduct of the trade.44 Calhoun's Report, issued in 1818, 
called for the abolition of the !actories. In their place, 
Calhoun envisioned stringent government~ regulations over the 
conduct of private traders. He suggested that licenses should cos 
from $100 to $500, thereby limiting the number of traders in the 
area. In addition, the traders were to be oonfined to designated 
locations. All such regulations were intended to insure the gov-
ernment's supervision over the conduct of the trade.45 These 
reoommendations were not immediately accepted. 
Realizing that Congress was g.adualll moving to the abolish-
ing of the factories unless they improved, McKennel instituted 
several measures to halt the financial losses. He !irst intro-
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duced a doublecheck accounting system tor the factory. Betore any 
bills or accounts could be sent to the central ottice in George-
town, they had to be cleared by Governor Cass, the Superintendent 
ot Indian attairs tor the area.46 In this way, McKenney hoped to 
insure the correctness ot all accounts by an area supervisor. 
McKenney also prohibited the aale of furs at the tactory, re-
quiring instead that all turs had to be sent to the central 
otfice.47 This regulation enabled McKenney to exerci.e personal 
supervision over the sale of furs. 
Opposition grew against the tactories with the publication of 
the Reverend Jedidiah Morsets Report. Morse had been dispatched 
by the Committee on Indian Aftairs to investigate the factories. 
Interviewing Matthew Irwin, Morse discovered that the Green Bay 
factory conducted the majority of its buainess with the white 
tr.ders and the military personnel at Port Howard. Annual trade 
with the Indiana did not exceed $1600, Irwin estimated, while 
trade with Port Howard and people ot mixed blood accounted tor 
'$,$00. Irwin placed primary blame tor the failure of his tactory 
upon the large number ot traders in the territory, thus causing 
him to sell to white inhabitants.48 Turning to Chicago, Morse 
found that Varnum, tor the past year, had traded for rurs amount-
ing to only $2$. Although recognizing the intluence or whiskey 
upon the trade, Morse said the Indians were not actually mal-
treated by the trader. The Indians dealt with the private traders 
because they wanted to and "it is evident, that by some means, 
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the Indians have not confidence in the government, as fair and 
upright in their trade.-49 Morse found several reasons for the 
distrust of the factory by the Indians; the inferior quality of 
its goods, prior influence of British traders, and the harmtul 
effects ot whiskey. Morse thought that the principal aim of the 
factory system, the civilisation of the Indians, had been a total 
failure. Rather than advance the Indians, the factory kept them 
in the hunter stsge of civilization by inoreasing their depend-
enoe on the fur trade.50 
In 1821, the Committee on Indian Attairs in the Senate, held 
tinal bearings before abolishing the factory. Irwin again 
aocused the American Fur Company of ruining the tac tory. lie 
stated that his sub-factor, Louis Rouss, was dispatched to the 
51 interior where Crooks deliberately sent three men to oppose him. 
Crooks refuted such accusations by again illustrating that the 
supplying of private traders was against the purpose ot the fac-
tory. He claim.ed that Irwin supplied Rouse the goods totaling 
$3000 and that Rouse, in order to derive a profit, 80ld the goods 
$2 
at prices higher than required by the factory. 
John Biddle, the new Indian agent at Green BaY'. presented 
testim.ony whichr:shnwed a definite hostility to the factory aystem. 
Biddle stated that tlie goods supplied the rae tory were interior 
in qualIty to those of private traders. Further, he claimed that 
Irwin had not only supplied large amounts ot goods to sub-factors 
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but also sold goods to private traders on credit. In sum, tactors 
such as Varnum and Irwin had overstated their case against the 
British, Biddle explained, and had failed to realize the inade-
quacy ot their own goods, The tactory was of no use to the 
frontier community, Biddle said; and its end vould be a blessing 
to the Indians,53 
McKenney vas forced to initiate action tor the closing ot 
the Green Bay and Chicago factories betore Congressional action. 
He retused, nevertheless, to acquiesce in the reasons advanced by 
Congress tor such action. The factories were not ineftective 
because of inadequacy of goods or Indian hostility, McKenney 
claimed, Their demise vas the result ot u • • • unsuitable 
provisions,which exist for the regulation of the trade. Hordes 
ot private adventurers, availing themselves of the looseness of 
the system, have crowded into those parts on account ot the super-
iority of the furs which are taken ••• "54 McKenney felt that 
the closing ot the tactories vould cause the alienation ot the 
Indian from the vhite settlements and eventually bring bloodshed. 
He vas forced, hovever, to instruct Varnum and Irvin to begin 
closing their affair.,55 
As CongreSSional action neared for the closing ot the fac-
tori •• , the most outspoken protagonist in Congress was Thomas 
Hart Benton. Benton wielded consid.rable influence since he vas 
both an inhabitant ot a frontier state and a ranking member ot the 
Senate Committe. on Indian Arfairs. 56 Because ot his connection 
with Ramsay Crooks of the American Fur Company, some authors have 
claimed that Benton was extremely prejudiced against the fac-
tories.57 Such accusations do not seem warranted, however, be-
cause Benton could have become an enormously rich man through 
these supposed connections.58 Benton, nevertheless made several 
mistakes in his zeal to rid the frontier of the factory. In his 
many lengthy polemics against the system in the Senate, Benton 
constantly claimed that inferior goods were purehased tor the 
trade. Bis major objection was against eight gross ot Jew's 
harp. which he ridiculed as totally unsuitable to tbe Indian 
trade.59 Such objects were extremely popular with the Indians, 
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McKenney retorted; and thus suitable to the trade. McKenney 
also pointed out that the stocking ot interior goods could not be 
avoided. Such goods were purchased in large quantIties after the 
War, he claimed, when goods were ot poor QUallty.6l McKenney'. 
position .eemed tairly accur~e. In 1815, J. Mason, then head ot 
the factory system, had admitted that the goods .elected for the 
trade were inferior because shortages of all products were 
62 
occasioned by the War • " It 
What was the basic c~use of the failure of the factory 
system? Scholars have advanced many reasons. That traders could 
extend credit to the Indians while the tactor could not bas been 
6,3 
a popular explanation for the failure. As sbown by John 
Biddle's testimony, Irwin did extend credit to both white. and 
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Indians. Crooks and Stuart also frowned on traders giving credit 
to the Indians so this traditional explanation loses much of its 
credibility. Whiskey could not be considered the only major 
cause since the American Fur Company vas not anxious to have the 
trader deal in this commodity. A drunken Indian vas as little use 
to the fur trader as the tactor. That the tactor could not ob-
tain Indian furs because he could not go to the hunting grounds hal 
been another traditional eXPlanation.64 At least in the case ot 
Green Bay, however, this was not true. Irwin had dispatched his 
own traders. In many respeots an early resident of Green Bay 
found a plausible answer for Irwin's tailure. 
Major I~in was a gentleman ot intelligence, 
culture and integrity, and as well fitted for 
the trust as any citizen totally unacquainted 
with the Indian country, its trade and inhabi-
tants, could be--that is, not fitted at all; 
and moreover, being furnished by the government 
with goods unsuited to the Indian trade, and 
comins in competing contact with lite-lons 
experienced, astute traders, ot course the 
effort to gain confidence, trust and influence 
with the Indians was a total tailure. Hi. 
sleazy, woolen blankets, cheap calico, and 
worst of all, his poor unserviceable guns, were 
all rejected by the Indian.; and during his four 
years trade, he dlernot secure titt7 dollar. 
worth of peltries. ~ 
Thus, the factory's failure was the result ot a combination 
ot factors: the unsuitable personnel (both Jacob Varnum and 
Matthew Irwin were from the East), unsuitable goods, and the 
whiskey problem. The proble., though, can be reduce. to more 
baaic considera)ions. The tactory was a 8mall business attempting 
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to compete with the vast organization of the American Fur Company. 
In addition, the success of the factory was impossible because 
of the government's inability to establish a consistent policr in 
relation to the Indian trade. The government, by tollowing a 
two-sided Indian trade policy, br allowing private traders to 
flourish while the factory was in existence, was a totallr in-
adequate arrangement. By allowing private traders in the terri-
tory, the government provided the competition which ruined its 
own factories. How could a government business with appropria-
tions ot only .300,000 compete with established private traders 
and the emerging million dollar capital ot the American Pur 
66 Companr' With the abolition ot the factory srstem, the government 
at least recognized its inability to follow a dual policy. The 
government now merely sought to control and regulate the traders, 
not compete with the •• 
The tinal closing ot the factory was a contused and tragic 
incident. In 1821, McKenney had ordered Vamua and Matthew Irwin 
to begin the aale ot their remaining goods on a cash or credit 
baais.67 Such a policy was in accord with John Calhoun's Report 
issued in 1818 that the factoriea ahould be liquidated over a 
period of time. Benton, in his zeal to end the syste., demanded 
their closing within two montha. Several Washington businessmen 
were commissioned to take charge otthe final accounting. Theae 
men, coming trom the East, were totally unacquainted with the 
68 factory and the type of business conducted. lte.dless to aay, 
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Benton'. hasty action caused an ultimate loss ot government funds 
and added credence to those who had claimed the factory had always 
been an impractical scheme. In Chicago, Jacob Varnum had mer-
chandi.e worth nearly $1),000. t A. B. Lindsay. who was commi •• 
sioned to close the factory, eventually realized only $1,250 in 
69 
cash from this merchandise. 
Lindsay took the merchandise to Detroit where it was aold 
at prices far below cost. In addition, the outstanding debts ot 
Indians and white. were totally ignored because of the two-month 
close-out period.?O Varnum, the Chicago factor, characterized 
the policy ot Thomas Hart Benton and the Congress aa completely 
inept: 
Mr. Benton had his own way. It was not probable 
that one in ten in Congress knew muoh about an 
obscure system for the benetit of the Indians, 
inaugurated long before a large portion ot the 
members were elected. He debated it alone ••• 
oarried 811 measures, one of which was so absur.e 
as to require a new let of agents to relieve the 
old one and whose duty it would be to wind up the 
concerns. !he effect ot this measure, so far 
a8 the Chicago factory was concerned was a total 
lOIS of all government property. A. B. Lindsay, 
a hanger-on about the otfices tor an apPoint-?l 
ment tor years, obtained the situation ••• 
With the tactories closed, the American Pur Company was freed 
ot its most sustained competition. This Company now spread its 




THE CONDUCT OF THE FUR TRADE: THE AMERICAN FUR COMPANY'S CONTROL 
OF THE TRADE AND MANIPULATION OF THE FRONTIER COMMUNITY, 1821-24 
Before the abolition ot the Green Bay factory, the American 
Fur Company had made a decided ettort to gain the cooperation of 
the Green Bay traders. After their citizenship had been obtained, 
Lawe, the Grignons, and Jacques Porlier each traded on his own 
1 
account with the Company. This caused a considerable reduction 
in profits aince the traders were competing with each other. 
John Lawe traded in the immediate vicinity of Green Bay, Charles 
Grignon at the Portage of the POX-Wisconsin, Augustin Grignon at 
Grand Kakahlin, Louis Grignon on the Wisconsin, while Jacques 
Porlier located on Overton's Creek flowing into the upper end ot 
Lake Butte de Borts.2 During the season ot 1820-21, the Green 
Bay traders continually complained about the poor hunt. 3 Betore 
the 1821 trading season began, then, the American Pur Company 
suggested that several ot the Bay traders form a partnership to 
reduce their los.... The agr.ement included five trader.; Louis, 
Pierre, and Augustin Grignon, John Lawe, and Jacques Porlier. 
The traders agreed to share the protits derived, each partner re-
ceiving one-titth. the profit. or lo •• es. Under the term. ot the 
contract, tour members were to trade in the interior while one 
signatory remained at Green Bay to handle the busineas arfairs. 
Goods tor the trade were to be obtained from the American Fur 
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company under the name ot the Green Bay Oompany. The oontraot 
was to last for three years until August 1, 1824.4 
Diffioulties arose oonoerning the oontraot beoause Jacques 
Porlier, who before 1821 had traded on a partnership with Louis 
Rouse, was not present to sign. Ramsay Crooks, thel'efore, signed 
for Porlier hoping he would enter the agreement. Informing 
Po~lier of his action, Crooks persuaded him to enter the agree-
ment sinoe the competition would otherwise plaoe him in in-
extrioable eoonomio diffioulties.5 The Green Bay traders had 
fallen into debt by oompeting with each other in the tr.de. The 
american Pur Company had supplied their individual needs until 
this contract. By torming this contr.ot, the Green B.y tr.der. 
admitted the cDntrol which the Amerioan Fur Oompany exerted over 
their eoonomic livelihood. Thi. control w •••• p.oi.lly evident 
in the formation ot the contr.ct. The Am.rican Fur Company 
agreed to .upply only the tive tr.ders sp.cified in the contr.ct. 
Therefore numerous other traders suoh as Lewis Rouse, who had 
previously traded tor the Company, were left without goods for 
6 the trade. 
The Green Bay Company immediately encountered difficultie. 
with the terms of the oontraot. Stuart had agreed to refr.in 
from sending any other tr.der. to deal with the Menomine. Indians 
7 
within the Oreen Bay regioh. The Green Bay tr.ders, however, 
deoided to follow the Menominees all the w.y to the Mississippi 
ss 
River territory which belonged to Joseph Rolette trom Prairie du 
Chi.n. Eventually, Crooks and Stuart gave Augustin Grignon p.r-
mission to .nter Rol.tte's area but only above the talls ot It. 
Anthony. Crooks also told Rolette that Augustin Grignon would 
ent.r his trading territory, but at the sa.e time aaaured Rolette 
that he could trade with the Menominee. it Grignon's pre.ence 
cau.ed .eriou. economic 10 ••• 8 
In 1822, the Gre.n Bay trader. again faced heavy lo •• es. 
Crooks had little patience with these men. He sarca.tically 
characterized their business attitude as • • • • an unconquerable 
aver.ion to economy, and their only care .... s to be to get into 
their prote.sion the means ot p"pering their indolence-- a want 
of principle i. everJWhere apparent." Crooks's comment about 
"a want ot principl." was prompted by the actions ot Augustin 
Grignon who had gone to wint.r belov the talls ot St. Anthony an 
the Mississippi River. Rolett. had extensive cr.dits tor trade 
goods with the Sioux in thi. area. According to Crooks, Grignon 
had taken th.ir turs knowing they vere indebted to Rolette. Ad-
mitting that hi. intoraatlon vas merely here.ay, Crooks supported 
Rolette's accusations. Bis .tory vas supported not becau.e it 
va. nece.sarily true, but becau.e he vas a aore Bucce •• tul trader. 
Rolette'. ability to extract t~emendou. protits trom the trade, 
Crooks realized, demanded that his connection with the Company 
9 be maintained. 
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The presence ot Augustin Grignon in Rolette'. territory 
finally exploded into violence. In January, 1822, Augustin 
Grignon's trading house was burned and his goods confiscated by a 
band of Sioux. Louis Grignon immediately advised his brother to 
10 discover the cause of the Indian's hostility. A8 soon as 
Ramsay Crooks heard of the incident, he suspected that Rolette's 
11 
ambition had carried him too far. Jacques Porlier, a partner 
in the Green Bay Company, took more immediate action. Writing to 
Governor Cass, Porlier accused Rolette of inciting the Indians. 
He pointed out that Rolette also had an outfit 1n the same area 
which the supposedly unattached Indians did not molest. Further, 
Porlier claimed that the Indians admitted that they had been 
12 incited by a white trader. Cass forwarded the accusations 
against Rolette to John Calhoun, the Secretary of War, advising 
that Rolette's license be revoked. l ) Lack of evidence, however, 
prevented the agent tor Indian affairs at Prairie du Chien troM 
trom initiating legal action against Rolette.14 
The American Fur Company temporarily eliminated the trouble 
between Rolette and Grignon by concluding a contract in which 
both men agreed to refrain from trading with the Indians usually 
credited by the other. Stuart was quite sure that the Green Bay 
traders would berak the agreement, but he felt that he must con-
15 tinue to employ them lest the territory be overrun by competition. 
Stuart had a great deal more confidence in the abilities ot 
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Rolette and provided him with muoh larger quantities of goods 
than any of his oompetitors or fellow traders. Realizin~ that 
Rolette oould destroy the business of any of his oompetitors, 
Stuart cautioned him that, although suoh aotion would rid the 
Amerioan Fur Company of an eoonomio liability (Green Say Company), 
16 
other oompetitors might prove more harmful. Rolette followed 
the advice of Stuart and Crooks and entered into a mutual agree-
ment with the Green Bay Company.l7 
The Amerioan Fur Company kept Joseph Rolette well supplied 
with goods and even supported his most treacherous actions. A 
most interesting oontrast was the attitude and polioy followed 
with less sucoessful members of the Green Bay Company. As early 
as October, 1821, Stuart expressed his dissatisfaotion with the 
18 Green Bay Company's returns. With the destruction of Augustin 
Grignon's outfit by Rolette, the prospects tor the trade ot 1822 
appeared dim. Although the American Pur Company realized the 
Green Bay Companr would make tew protits, Crooks and Stuart re-
fused to give up their economic control ot the area by breaking 
the contract. Stuart decided to aocept the losses of the Green 
Say Company rather than to throw the ~erritory open to competition 
• • • Sesides I know that Lockwood made them a 
liberal ofter to supply all their wants; and let 
the result be loss again, they would have strength-
ened his opposition, so as to make it of serious 
consequence to our operation tor there would be no 
restraint whatever; and it would be throwing them 
completely into the arms of our opponents, which, 
as I have alreadr stated might be of no beneficial 
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result to either of them, but still must have 19 
turned out of seriQus detriment to us. 
John Lawe was dissatisfied with the American Fur Company and 
their supposed beneficent trade arrangements. According to Lawe, 
he and the other Bay traders were forced to form the Green Bay 
Company, The American Fur Company, then, sold them goods at out-
rageous prices and limited the areas in which they coul. trade, 
Lawe claimed. Lawe was aware ot Crooks's tactical maneuvers. He 
realized that the Company" ••• didn't wish I believe to ruin 
20 
us tor tear an opposition might form and come into the country." 
On the contrary, Lawe said, the Ameridan Fur Company wished to 
take their furs at the lowest possible prices, thus keeping the 
Green Bay traders in debt. To accomplish this, the American 
Fur Company sent other men to trade with the Menominees, refused 
to allow Lawe to trade at Milwaukee, and opposed the Green Bay 
Company at the Portage of the Wisconsin and down the lower 
Wisconsin River.2l 
Robert Stuart, accused ot waging open war on the Green Bay 
Company's trading area, denied it unconditionally: n ••• It 
it is an insinuation that we do 80, I deny the tact ••• In 
short I am convinced you are fully sensible that it is not in any 
way in our interest to injure your concern. n22 It would seem 
highly probable that the Green Bay traders were harsh in their 
claims that Stuart was flooding their territory with opposing 
traders. By the arrangements ot the American Pur Company each 
""'" 
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trader had a specifio territory; for e~mple, Josep. Rolette in 
the Prairie du Chien area and Solomon Juneau and J. Beaubien at 
Milwaukee. The Green Bay traders, on the other hand, in an attemp1 
to reooup past 108ses filtered throughout the area from Milwaukee 
to the Mississippi. Despite the harsh aotion8 of Rolette, 
Augustin Grignon ~ad infringed upon his territory. 
Although Stuart may have been innocent of flooding the terri-
tory of the Green Bay Company with opposing traders, he oertainly 
was preJudioed in other business arrangements with the Green Bay 
Company. As early as 1821, Crooks warned the Green Bay men that. 
the Company would only supply a limited number of trade goods, 
sinoe they were all purohased on oredit. 23 At the same ttme, 
where an outfit did particularly well, the Amerioan Fur Oompany 
provided, on oredit, .s many goods as reQUested. 24 Although this 
may have been good business strategy, it lett the Green Ba,. 
traders with little hope ot ever improving their economio position 
Without an adequate supply of goods they oould not stand up to 
competition, nor were there suffioient profits among five people. 
Thus, the Green Bay Company graduall,. fell deeper into debt to 
the Amerioan Fur Compan,. whose power increased over ever,. aspect 
of the trader's life. 
To protect the American p~ Company against the debts ot the 
Green Bay Oompany" Crooks decided to obtain mortgages on their 
property. Aocording to Crooks's estimate, the Green Bay Company 
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owed $16,000 in debts: 
Comment is unnecessary, we must ••• secure 
by Mortgages what oan be got at and should you 
get mortgages let their terms be of as short 
duration as possible -- for I am doubttul how 
the most of those gentry stand affected towards2~ 
us. ~ 
Ihicago presented an entirely different problem for the 
American Fur Company. In 1821-22, Chicago was still a relatively 
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SMall village with nine or ten houses occupied by French traders. 
The number of Indians in the Chicaf.o area was nearly double that 
of the Green Bal area, thus enabling the SMaller numbers of 
Chicago traders to reap greater profits.27 In addition, the 
Chicago trade was conducted in a different manner than at Green 
Bay. In 1821, the combined nations of the Potawato.i, Ottawa, 
and Chippewa ceded five million acres ot land to the United States 
In return for this land, the government agreed to pay the Indians 
an annual subsidy at or near Chicago. The American Fur Company 
and tur traders, then, decided to change the operation of the 
Indian trade. Now the traders vould descen. upon Chicago during 
the annuity payments to exchange goods for the Indian's newly 
aoquired money. Although these annuity payments did not supplant 
the older method of trade in furs, they did provide a lucrative 
28 
traffio in Money from the Indian trade. Chicapo, then, vas 
potentially a more lucrative trading area beoause of the smaller 
, 
white population, the presence of a larger number ot Indians, a. 
well as the trade at the annuity payments. 
61 
Chicago proper, however, was not a trading ar&Q.' Like Green 
Bay, Chicago was the depot for the collection of turs and dis-
persal of gOOd8 tor the traders of the interior. Gurdon Hubbard, 
a proMinent Chicago trader, was led to remark that "by this time 
(1820) there wa8 a very liMited trade here, in taot, thi8 plaoe 
never had been preeminent a8 a trading post.n29 
With the withdrawal of the Cactory system, the American Fur 
Company began to oonsolidate its hold on the Chteago area. 
Chicago as compared to Green Bay was not a closely organized 
society and each diCferent trader had to be gathered into the fold 
of the Company. From 1821-24. the Americ&n Fur Company i* its 
efforts to organize the Chicago area did not reap great profits. 
John Crafts, the former agent of the Gonnent and Mack Com-
pany, finally joined the American Fur CompaIl)" in 182.3. Crnf'ta 
was especially obstinate about his trading territory and wage 
contract. Originally Crafts wished to receive the various goods 
from Michililllackinac on joint account with John Kinzie, in-
cluding the territories of the Illinois River, Chicago. Milwaukee, 
St. Joseph, Fort Wayne, and the wabash. 30 Robert Stuart objected 
to the contract for two reasons. He was hesitant about em-
ploying John Kinzie since he was then sub-Indian agent. Govern-
Mental authorities, Stuart thought, might object to Kinzie serving 
both the CompanJ and the government. Seoondly, such an agreement 
would have infringed upon the territories assigned to other trade 
outfits such as Beaubien at Milwaukee, John Lawe at Green Bay, 
and Hubbard on the Illinois River. Eventually, Crafts obtained 
an area which included the Rock River, the Fox River counties, 
and the immediate neighborhood of Chicago. 3l Crafts a180 avoided 
the profit-sharing wage agreement with the Company and instead re-
ceived an annuel salary of $1000. This wage alreement displeased 
Robert Stuart aince the American Fur Company would have to suffer 
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all the 10s8ea on the Chicago outfit while Crafts received $1000. 
Gurdon Hubbard, like the tradera at Green Bay, was also ex-
tremely displeased with the pay of the American Fur Companr. In 
1823, Hubbard consIdered quitting the Indian trade if a raiae was 
not forthcoming.)) Hubbard, since 1818, had drawn onll $260 per 
year as a clerk. Stuart, rather than lose hi. aervices and en-
counter him 8S a competitor, appointed him head of the Illinois 
outfit at an annual salary of $400. 34 With territories rather 
olearly delineated and capable persona employed, Stuart was now 
ready to exploit the Chicago trade. 
The operations ot the trade throughout the period were char-
acterized by the tremendous influence ot the American Fur Companr 
on both the national and local level. In Chicago, John Kinzie 
was serving as sub-Indian agent, yet he also maintained business 
relations with the American Fur Compan7. These relations wore 
eapecial17 evident in 1824 when John Crafts left tor Mackinao, 
and the Ohicago post was placed in the charge ot John Hamlin. 
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While Crafts was absent, John Kinzie was evidentl,. conneoted with 
the trade even though sub-Indian agent. Stuart wrote Htmlin ex-
pressing confidence in his ability to cere tor the post but 
assuring him that John Kinzie would give all the help possible 
35 despite his delicate position. Kinzie's position was especially 
delicate at this time since the Indian annuity pa,.ents were 
arriving trom Washington. Wishing to prosper trom th~s annual 
payment, Hamlin sent to Mackinac for an extra supply ot 800ds,36 
Kinzie, as an Indian 'agent, was suppo.ed to protect tne Indian 
from the selling ot goods at intlated price. by the trader; but 
his position .ee.ed to waver between the interests ot the Indi~ 
snd the A.erican Pur Company. John Kinzie'. relation to tne 
Company vas apparent in 1823 when Stuart oautioned David Laughton, 
a Chicago trader, not to emploJ anJ gooda in the Indian annultJ' 
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trade until John Eins!. could exert hi. intluence on the Indian •• 
On the national level, the American Fur Cpmpany bad long 
wished to .ee the complete abolition ot the liquor trade with the 
Indians. L1.quor not on11 led to atrocities bJ' the Indians but 
also inhibited their abilit,. to hunt. In 1828, therefore, the 
government passed a law definitel,. outlawing an,. liquor tram 
being transported into the Indian territor,. The law provided 
38 penalties of confiscation of goods and trading lic8nae.. The 
Green Bal' traders welcomed the ne" lav since their major oppoal-
tion came trom traders employing interior goods but a large 
39 
supply of whiske1.·. 
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The American Pur Company, however, drasticall, altered their 
policy toward the use of liquor in the late l820'a.40 By this 
time, Stuart vas quite ready to admit that the Companl utilized 
liquor in its trade. 
• • • There are .everal parts of the country 
we had much better abandon than .end without it; 
and in short ve must either send aome vherever 
there is oPPosition, particularll along the 
trontier • • • or • • • ve must give up that trade 
entirely; if lOU think proper to leave this 
matter to my discretion I teel confident we shall 
not otten get into ditticulty; and should you 
forbid it altogether. rest assured the consequence 
will be extremely injurious; ot this Mr. Crooks 
vho you can consult, must be tully senaible, tor 
he cannot have torgotten hov much we suttered by nl not sending liquor in 1817 and 1818 •• _ _ ~ 
Stuart, theretore, concluded an agreement with Governor Cass, 
ae was allowed to employ limited quantities ot liquor where 
British opposition was most pronounced. The territories in which 
this liquor was permitted inCluded the Green Bay and Chicago 
regions.42 In 182$. the American Pur Company bought nearly 3,000 
gallons ot vhiskeyand 2,000 gallons ot high wlnes.43 In 1826, 
Stuart intormed John Kinzie that tne chier commodity ot the out-
tit for that year would be liquor.44 The strange aspect ot the 
entire liquor policy vas Stuart'. claim that the liquor vaa u.ed 
to root out British opposition around Green Bay and Chicago. In 
actual fact, before 1822, Stuart had already captured these areas 
from the British and any British trader. in the are. were probably 
employed by the Company_ In essence, it seemed as if Stuart vas 
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using national policy to consolidate hi. monopoly by driving out 
private traders who were usually American citizens. B1 1827, 
Stuart'. prerogative to use liquor in certain areas was ended. 
Governor Cass was finally directed by Waahington otficials to 
allow no exceptions to the liquor law ot 1822.45 
In 1824, the United States government passed another law 
designed to regulate the conduct of the Indian trade. This law 
specifically .tated that: 
Indian agent. to de.ignate, from time to time, 
certain convenient and .uitable places for 
carrying on trade with the dirferent Indian 
tribe. and to require all traders to trade at 46 
the place thus designated, and at no other place. 
The law enabled Indian agents to exercise .tricter control 
over the traders. In this way Briti.h trader. could be eliminated 
trartic in whiskey could be curtailed, and the Indian'. weltare 
could be .ateguarded. The law wa. originally .upported by the 
American Pur Company, tor it provided another legal mean. tor the 
Company to eliminate competition. In the Green Bay region and 
throughout the territory, license. granted to a priYate trader 
required him to trade at a de.ignated .pot. The American Pur 
Company would then er.ct a post nearby and reduce the price of it. 
goods so dra.tically that the private trader would be forc.d out 
of bu.in.... Once the private trader had been eliminated, the 
Company would rai.e it. prices to recoup the lo.ses .uttered in 
breaking down the oppo.ition.47 The law va. al.o quite tavorable 
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to the Green Bay traders since the posts designated by Indian 
agent Breevoort were those ordinarily used by the Green Say 
traders. The posts assigned to the Green Say traders included: 
Grand Kakahlin, Winnebago Lake at the post Fond du Lao, Butte de 
Morts, Portage at the Wisoonsin, upper Wisconsin, and Milwaukee.48 
Although the law operated quite favorably for the Company in 
the Green Bay area, the Chicago region became a trouble spot. The 
looal Indian agent, Dr. Woloott, refused to grant trading locationl 
desired by Robert Stuart. Stuart immediately wrote Governor Cass 
and stated his displeasure with the law. Cass had been quite 
friendly and helpful to the Company on numerous oooasslona whioh 
Stuart hoped would also apply to this situation. Stuart felt 
that the law was unfair, sinoe the Company's traders, being known 
throughout the area, would be required to looate at a speoific 
post. Meanwhile, private traders, unknown by the Indian agent, 
would be able to avoid the law. This problem did not arise at 
Green Bay beoause most of the traders ot that area resided in 
Green Bay and were known to each other and the Indian agent. Por 
this reason, Stuart did not oonoeal his desire that Governor 
Cas8 request Dr. Wolcott at Chicago to relax the law in the case 
of the American Fur Company: 
I hope, Sir, that lOU will have the goodness to 
request Dr. Wolcott to grant Mr. Cratts lioenses 
for this reason, with the usual privileges that 
is, not to be contined to a designated spot, for 
others have the liberty of running abtut in the 
vicinity of their posts and it would be ruinous 
67 
for him not to have the same advantage.49 
To avoid losing the profits of the 18~ Chicago outfit, 
stuart wrote to George 507d, the Indian agent at Mackinac, asking 
$0 
him to grant Crafts a license tor one 7ear. Knowing that 50yd 
was quite friendly toward the Compan7, Stuart hoped to supercede 
the authority of Dr. Wolcott of Chicago and avoid the restrictions 
of the national legislation. 
While Stuart was working behind the scenes pulling political 
strings, he warned John Crafts to obey the law 'as far as the 
situation would permit, $1 
As the winter trade sea80n approached, Stuart became more 
ea ... nt in his objections to the law. Both aeorge Boyd at 
Mackinac and Dr. Wolcott at Chicago had refused to grant the priv-
ileges requ.ated. Stuart, therefore, advised John Crafts to 
circumvent the law. Pollow the Indians into the territory not 
for trade but tor the purpose of collecting debts and establishing 
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credit, Stuart told Cratts, Stuart quite correctly knew that 
the law only forbade traders to conduct trade in furs and goods 
outside the designated post, while sa71ng nothing about extending 
credit, Furthermore, Stuart suggested a means whereby the law 
could be totally ignored, 
• • • But in the event ot his adhering to his 
first determination, and that 70ur trade sutters; 
you must altho very repugnant to the inclinations 
ot the Company, or its agenta, use the only means 
left you in aecuring us from serious loss, which 
is to contine your unlicensed trade to the lands 
ce.ed to the United States. • • • 53 
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Since the Indian agent only possessed jurisdiction over the 
Indian territory. Crafts could trade along the boundary between 
ceded and unceded lands without being required to locate at any 
definite post. By the Indian treaty ot 1821, large segments ot 
land in the Chicago area had been obtained by the United States. 
This land, then, would constitute the area in which Stuart and 
Cratts would once again avoid the laws of the United States. 
Despite hil many objections to the law, Stuart received 
little aid fram Governor Cass or the national go_ernment. The 
law had little effect on Green Bay, but it was disastrou. in 
Chicago and other trade regions. In 1826, Stuart was still quite 
active in attempting to secure the law's repeal. He cited two 
reasons for this repeal. Because the Indian trapping areas 
varied trom year to year due to the increasing scarcity of game, 
the trading posts had to tollow such movements. Stuart teared 
that a post established one year might be located too tar away 
for etrective trade the next. Secondly, it was extremely ditti-
cult to advance the Indians any credit under such a s7stem. It 
the trader could not tollow the Indians into their hunting 
grounds, he could not determine the prospects ot the trade, nor 
could he be assured, after advancing credit, that the Indians 
would deliver the furs.54 The law remained on the books, never-
theless, since it was preci.ely these abu ••• which the gov.rnment 
wi.hed to eliminate. Many times the trader would advance the 
Indians creditJ and then he would pay a low price for the turs, 
r 
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dragging the Indians deeper into debt. With designated posts, 
the Indian agent could prevent many or these abuses. 
In this period of consolidation, 1821-24, 'the American Fur 
Company had firmly established economic control over Green Bay, 
Chicago, and Milwaukee. The Oreen Bay Oompany was in complete 
subservience through debts to Astor's tirm. In Ohicago, the 
American Pur Oompany had just initiated ita control. On the 
rrontier, this control waa evident in the utilization ot local 
otficiala, auch aa Major Puthutt and George Boyd, tor the benetit 
of the Company. The national legislation passed in 1822 and 1824 
to control the operation ot the trade had little ettect on the 
Oompanr_ It Crooks and Stuart tound the lavs harmful to the 
conduct ot 'business, they either obtained permission trom looal 
otticials to avoid the lavs or operated against the spirit ot the 
legislation. During this period ot the American Fur Company's 
consolidation, nevertheless, the nature ot trontier societ7 was 
changing. These chan~e8 gradually undermined the fur trade 
societ7 and the monopoly ot the American Pur Company. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE FUR TRADE IN TRANSITION: THE AMERICAN 
FUR COMPANY IN GREEN BAY AND CHICAGO, 1824~1828 
While the government vas establishing lawa to regulate the 
Indian trade, the community of Green Bay waa undergoing a rapid 
transformation. As the trade oontinually declined, the original 
inhabitants were beaieged by an advancing civilization. 
Between 1819 and 1824, Green Bay experienoed an influx of 
settler., not Prench or British in extraction, but Americana 
from the East. Gradually, such people brought an ener~etic and 
stronrly competitive torm of lite to the carefree community.l 
During this period merohants, suoh as Daniel Whitney. Robert 
Irwin, and Colonel Childs. arrived. Prote.aional men. SUCA as 
2 James Doty. Henry Baird, and Judge Arndt, also came. By 1824, 
Green Bay was still predominately Prenoh and British, but also had 
aix or eight enterprising American tamilie.,3 
This new immigration exerted a definite ettect on the old 
tur trader., In 1822, the soldiers had moved out ot Port Howard 
to Camp Smith, two miles up the river. Here the new immigrants 
established what came to be known aa Shanty Town to supply the 
wants of the soldier. and their tamilie.. There were two prin-
ei"l store. in Shanty Town which supplied merohandiae to the 
oommunity. The.e .tores vere operated by Daniel Whitney and 
Robert Irwin.4 Whitney, by the judgement ot hia oontemporaries, 
vas the most ambitious businessman ot the territory_ Be employed 
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several clerks in his store and eventually brought carpenters, 
5 blacksmiths, painters, and farmers to the area. Whitney pro-
vided • direct threat to the native fur traders by providing a 
non-American Fur OompanY' concern where the re.idents could pur-
chase good. at competitive price.. In addition, Whitney also 
supplied traders with goods. Lawe, Augustin Grignon, and Jacque. 
Parlier faced serious opposition from Whitney. To make matter. 
worse, he besan to outfit the younger brothers of Augustin 
I:> Grlf:non. 
Even though Whitney only began operation in Green Bay during 
1820, by late 1821 he posed a proble.. Robert Stuart considered 
Whitney'. venture doomed to failure and cautioned Lawe about ex-
tending his credits to compete with h1a.1 In 1822, Stuart, be-
cause he had .ent the Green Bay Company les. than a full comple-
ment of good. due to hi. lack of trust in taeir abilitie., became 
worried that the Green Ba1 traders might purchase extra supplies 
from Whitney_ Stuart knew, that .ince Whitney was located at the 
Bay, he would receive paJment tor the goods advanced before the 
American Fur Oompany. To prevent any auch oocurrence, he oau-
tioned Augustin Grignon against any bu.ine.s arrangement with 
8 Whitney without the Company'. knowledge. 
The presence of Robert Irwin at Green Bay also oaused little 
initial concern to Stuart. Oommenting on the store ot Robert 
Irwin, Stuart said he " _ _ _ believed the house of whioh Mr. 
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Irwin i8 8aid to be agent will create more nolse than ettect, 
9 but it more tools will come, why we must weloome thelll." John 
Lawe considered the men in Shanty Town a more serious threat. In 
November, 182), Lawe wrote to his partner Jacque. Porlier that 
the traders in Shanty Town were attempting to deal with Indians 
who already were on credit to the Green Bay Campany. Lawe warned 
Parlier to collect all debts betore the Indians departed tram 
the interior. If at all possible, Lave exhorted, keep the 
10 Indians away tram Green Bay. Lawe vaa eapecial17 distrusttul 
aince the Indians were making .ery rew hunt. and, even those tew 
peltrie. they collected, were taken to Shanty Town. Th. control 
ot the trade, Lawe said, vas alipping tram hia handa aino ..... 
• it is true that they (Shanty To~) aell so very low and that 
their goods are so muoh cheaper than ours that it toea enti •• 
both the White. and Indians to trade with tne •• - ll Both the 
American Fur Company and the Green Bay traders reared that the 
new oOllDl'leroial elements would engage in the fur trade to supple-
ment their small busines8 with other white settlers. 
The Green Bay traders also viewed the presenoe or military 
torces a8 a detinite hinderance to their aociety. Contrary to 
some idyllic aocounts ot the role at the military in the settle-
ment at the country, it was definitely or little aid to the Green 
12 Bay region betore 1829. The military post during the 1820'a 
was a self-sufficient economic unit. All 8upplles and gooda tor 
r 
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the post were brought tram the commissary otfice in Washington. 
Not until the 1830's did the communit7 at Green Ba7 supp17 the 
13 
needs ot Fort Howard. ThU8, the military personnel stationed 
at Fort Howard provided not only a 80urce of rules and regulations 
for the inhabitants but a180 a competitive economic unit.~ 
The soldiers were unpopular with the residents. John Lawe 
accused 80ldiers ot driving ott his tew cattle and slaughtering 
his pigs. At one time, they broke into his trading store and con-
fiscated a large part ot the merchandise. The soldiers travelled 
at night in gangs of ten or twelve ransaeking tne stores, Lawe 
8ald, and thus he was forced to " ••• keep a great quantity ot 
dogs about the bouse tor to keep up (sic) a constant barking. I 
wish that regiment was exchanged tor ~le7 are a great nuisance in 
,,15 place of a protection tor the citizens ••• 
Lawe was .speolally critioal ot the economic arrangements 
or the ~ort. Eaoh tort poasessed a Butler's store which bad a 
large stock ot merchandise tor the needs ot the soldlers. With 
this supply of goods the Butler otten dealt with tn. white popu-
lation. Besides, the soldiers ra~.lJ purchased merchandi.e r~om 
the trader's store.. To permit one man, the sutler, to trade 
merohandis8 under little threat or eoonomio 10 •• was in Lawe's 
opinion an injustioe to the members ot the oommunity. In Lawe'. 
Judgement, the milItary" ••• were a nuisance to society and in 
place of being put there tor the ~roteetion of the place they 
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are the destruction ot it ••• "16 
The eftects of both the competition ot Shanty Town and the 
disruptions of the military were clearly evident in the economic 
condition ot the fur trade. In 182), David Stone and Company ot 
Detroit (formerly Stone Bostwick & Company), a competitor of the 
American Fur Company, had decided to merge with Stuart and CrookS. 
This merger necessitated a complete accounting ot the Company's 
books. Theretore, Robert Stuart notified the various outtits 
that all accounts would be settled at the end of the 1823 season;7 
Robere Stuart planned to use this opportunity for concluding new 
arrangements for the Green Bay area. ae tound the Green Bay 
traders totally incapable of managing a corporate struoture such 
as the Green Bay Company. Many ot the Green Bay traders were now 
negleoting to go into the Indian oountry, remaining instead at 
the Bay. Stuart also objected to the increasing number of rela-
tives hired as 'agents ot the Green Bay Company. ae intended to 
close out their books, and trom then on only supply a limited 
number of traders in the Green Bay area. Stuart expressed conti-
18 dence onlr in the abilities ot John Lawe and Augustin Grignon. 
He was not anxious to engage in business with white settlers and 
preferred to maintain interests onlr in the fur trade. 
Although the Green Bay Company was disolved, Stuart continued 
to supply a large number of people in the Green Bay area. While 
the Green Bar Companr had only been a partnership of tive people, 
thus at least assuring these five people a share ot the protits, 
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noW the American Pur Company supplied individual tradera in the 
area. While on11 five people with a supply of goods totaling 
$8,626 were employed in 1824, by 1825 the trade waa expanded with 
fourteen people and only $8,)44 in gooda. By 1826, the number ot 
people trading was twenty-two with an increase to $11,617 in the 
19 
value ot goods. Thua, the proti ts derived by any aingle in-
dividual were considerably reduced; and, added to the many compet-
itive factora in the co .. unit~, it ia little wonder that the 
majority of traders were in debt to the American Pur Company. 
With the number ot fur bearing animals deolining, the ml1l-
"1'J':,'an4 Shant,. Town providing competition, the territory overrWl 
with traders, one mlght aak why dldn't the tradera aeek a new 
occupation! Why continue in an ocoupation which aurel,. wa. in-
'. 
c~patl. of yielding any profita' Part ot the explanation la,. in 
the •• allnea. ot the population making farming and other oraft. 
also unprotitable. Por the.e orlginal inhabitants, John Lawe 
exprea.ed the dilemna into which a changing oivilization had 
plunged the.: 
I will commence in aaying that the first year 
atter the War waa the last year I aaved m1aelt 
for every year aince I have been loaing mone1 
and not a little in that curaed Indian trade 
that I have alwaya peraisted and 40 still peraist 
to continue (but lOU may well aa1 or aak the ques-
tion why do you still oontinue since you find it a 
losing businesa) I will say I do not know what to 
do elae as I am not capable ot doing or following2 
any other kind of businesa. 0 
From 1823-1828, the atory of the Green Bay fur trade was one 
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of gradually dwindling profits. The few profits the Green Sal 
traders gained w.re still being threaten.d by Jos.ph Rolette. 
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Rolette was now in conflict with the Indians of James Porlier. 
Robert Stuart indicated little conc.rn with the complainta ot 
Porlier and Lawe against Rolette. Rather, Stuart blam.d both 
Lawe and Porli.r because they departed so late for the winter 
trading grounds. By the time Porli.r arrived at the Portage ot 
the Pox-Wisconsin, the Indians had alread7 b.en forced, b7 
necessitl, to purchase goods troa Rolette it they were to b.gin 
the bunt. In SUll, Stuart telt Rolette's actions were the tault 
ot Porlier hi.selt; and, thu., he retu.ed to take any action.22 
B7 1827, Porlier told Augu.tin Grignon that the post at the 
Portage ought to be abandoned. Thi. action was requir.d b7 the 
competition ot Rolette, the graduall7 d1lll1ni.hine; number ot 
Indian., and their lack ot di.po.ition to hunt.23 
Stuart realized the dwindling protit. ot the fur trade. 
According17, he in.ured him.elt again.t heavy 10 •••• b7 .upplying 
individual trad.rs only on a commia.ion basia. Stuart agr.ed to 
supply Jacques Vieau ot Gr •• n Bay tor trade in the Milwaukee ar.a. 
but he stipulated that Vieau must work on a strict profit-sharing 
scheme.24 Stuart concluded such a cautious agreement with Vieau 
aince. the Milwaukee territol"J wa. ov.rrun with trad.rs. Jean 
Beaubi.n, Sololl1on Jun.au, and James .l{inzi. w.r. again trading 
there. In addition, John Law. had sent a trad.r to Milwaukee.2S 
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Stuart became even more cautious about the trade When he lent 
Mich.el Douama~." American Pur Company agent, to assist Lawe and 
the other traders~Dousman, more acourately, was sent to Oreen 
Bay for the protection ot the AMerican Fur Company's intere.ts. 
St~art vi3hed to exercise striot supervision over the administra-
tion ot the Green Bay trade. He speoitically instructed the 
traders to issue no more credit. to the Indians tor a winter'. 
outtit. The large number or traders now in the territory, Stuart 
said, lett little hope ot ever obtaining the furs credited to the 
Indiana. To prevent the merchandi.e stores or Shanty Town rrom 
obtaining their furs, he told Mr. Dousman to ereot a store in the 
Shanty To~ area to enable him to keep a oareful e18 on the oppos-
ition. Lave vas also instructd never to advance· the white popula-
tion any credit since the, had too rew occupations to guarantee 
pa1l11ent. Although Stuart did not outlav trade vith the white 
.ettlers, he vas against makAng such business the primary occupa-
tion or the traders. Thererore, he required that any trade con-
26 ducted with the vbitea muat be on a caah baaia. 
The .trategic economic moves made by Stuart tor the benetit 
ot the Green Bay traders had 11ttle etteot. Por the trading 
season ot 182$, not one Green Ba1trader realized a protit. 
Stuart tound the ohiet reason tor the tailure in the opposition 
provided bi Daniel WJiltne,.27 He now recognised the serious 
threat that Whitney repre.ented to the American Pur Oompany •.. (,The 
only way to end Whitne,'s interference in the trade, Stuart relt, 
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was to emplor the traders upon whom he depended. Thus, Stuart 
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attempted to employ Paul and Amable Grignon. This action 
failed to materialize, and during the 1826 season, the American 
Fur Company found itselt opposed by seven •• aders employed by 
Daniel Whitner. Theretore, Stuart (to protect himselt) warnod 
his traders not to reduce their prices in oreier to ,compete with 
Whitney's men. Rather, Stuart lald. hold your goods and let 
Whitney's men ruin each other in competltion.29 
Stuart had employed John Lawe to supervise the traders ot 
the Green Bay area, but his perlonal taults caused Stuart some 
trepidation. Like an all-seeing boss, Stuart even tried to 
regulate Lawe's private lite, where it atfected business matters. 
In a letter the epitome of snide criticism and double meanings, 
Stuart oautioned Lawe on his drinking habits. Rumorl have 
., 
circulated, Stuart said, whioh claimed that • ••• John Lawe il 
as good as tellow as ever lIved, but must .oon ruin ht.lelt, tor 
the whiskey bottle is never ott his table, and he drinks with 
everrbodr, high or low, who loe. to his hou.e • • • • 
.30 
In addition to Lawe'. rather loo.e drinking habits, he 
aeemed to be a sott-touoh in business mattera. Ooods sent to the 
Green Bar area were entrusted to John Lawe for oirculation to the 
individual traders. Unfortunatelr. Lawe man, times dispensed 
the.G goods to his friends and close neighbors without adequate 
aecurit,_ In 1826. Stuart waa torced to iaaue a harsh warning 
against this practice. Lawe had given goods to Ghalfl:es Orignon 
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without security, and now Grignon had compiled a large debt with 
the Company. Stuart warned Lawe that if he did not prosecute 
Grignon in the courts, he would be held personally responsible 
for the debt. 3l 
With these many problems facing the Green Bay outfit, Stuart 
expressed real fear concerning the trading season of 1826-27. 
He expected a loss on all the outfits, but ~oped that by next 
32 
year many of the traders would be forced into other occupations. 
Stuart's fears were not without justification. Green Bay had its 
worst season collecting furs amounting to approximately $800. 33 
Considering that a total of $11,617 of merchandise was advanced 
34 for the entire area, the Green Bay traders had lost an irrepar-
able sum. The trade was not only bad for the American Fur Com-
pany traders, but Daniel Whitney also lost a considerable amount 
of money. If Stuart would be willing to compensate him, Whitney 
was even prepared to give up any further ventures in the tur 
trade. Stuart, always the master strategist, refused Whitney'. 
otfer. Conditions were now just as Stuart wanted them. Be 
merely wished to produce a stalemate in the Green Bay area. It 
the American Fur Company could make no money from the trade, it 
would at least maintain a token opposition for its competition. 
Therefore, Stuart rejected Whitney'. offer to sell ft ••• for 
altho we cannot abandon that trade, I would rather he should 
supply some ot the people than we, tor whether there is opposiion 
ou 
or not, no money is to be made there. n35 Why Stuart mainta.ned 
business connections. with the Green Bay traders has been diffi-
cult to judge. Although the trade had declined, 3tuart apparently 
feared that if competition was allowed to capture Green Bay, it 
might spread to more prosperous trade areas. In 1828, Stuart 
sent a larse supply of goods to the Green Bay region for the last 
time. At this lete date, there were still sixteen persons trading 
36 
on goods worth $9,756.50. 
In 1824, the influx of a few American iamilies had begun to 
change the character of the trade and the nature of the settle-
ment at Green Bay. In 1824, Green Ba, still had les8 than a 150 
37 permanent residents and the Frenc.-Britsh element was dominant. 
By 1827-28, however, Green Bay possessed between seven and eight 
38 hundred inhabitants. Clearly, the new American element now pre-
dominated. By 1835, the city of Gr&en Bay would possess little 
resemblance to the fur trade village of a decade earlier. 
While Green Bay was accumulating debts to the American Fur 
Company from 1822-28, the Chicago area was experiencing its most 
successful years in the !~r trade. Chicago was more prosperous 
as a trade center for several reasons. The principal reason 
rested on the delayed influence of civilization upon the fur trade 
community. In 1822, not only the competition of the factory 
system was ended, but in this year the troops ot Fort Dearborn 
39 
were withdrawn. The 8mall community at Chicago was now left 
on its own. While Green Bay was experiencing a graaual influx of 
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Yankee emigrants, Chioago remained an isolated fur trade village. 
One observer reported, upon passing through Chioago in 1827, that 
" • • • the plaoe had not improved since 1821; only two families 
yet resided there, those of Kinzie and Colonel Beaubien. n40 
Although Chioago was small, after 1825 it did experience the 
appearance of new settlers. They did not, however, provide a real 
threat to the conduct of the fur trade until 1827-28. 
Although by 1822, Stuart and Crooks bad eliminated their 
major competition tram the area, as in the Green Bay territory, 
they were plagued with small competitors. In June, 1824, John 
I Crafts was faced with the competition of a certain Oaptain 
Whiting. Whiting had attempted to employ so •• of Crafts's 
traders. This tactic was ended quickly by Crafts's hiring of his 
41 
men several months in advance. In August, 1824, Stuart was dis-
tur~ed by Captain Whiting's accusations that the Amerioan Pur 
Company used cut-throat business tactics to eliminate their 
opposition. Finally, disgusted with Whiting's bothersome compe-
tition, Stuart authorized Crafts to use his disoretion in deter-
mining whether or not to purchase Whiting's business: "Jou know 
the resources ot the country and the extent of injury you are 
likely to sustain from his winter operations. n42 By Maroh 2, 1825 
Crafts had purchased 'the business of Captain Whiting ending one of 
the few threats on the Company's monoPoly.43 William B. Astor, 
in New York, was very critical of Crafts's action in buying out 
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Whiting. To Astor, the Company could hardly afford to purchase 
the business of every small trader. Stuart defended Crafts's 
8.ction since Whiting had employed several traders to oppose him. 
Besides, Stuart said, the decision appeared very opportune since 
both the Illinois and Ohicago outfits were showing a considerable 
profit.44 
Stuart remained worried lest independent traders gain a foot-
hold in the Chicago area. When John Crafts died in 182$, Stuart 
advised that his trading store be destroyed " • • • rather than 
let it fall into the hands of anyone in the trade. n45 Since the 
new director of the Chicago trade planned to locate elsewhere, 
Stuart said, the destruction of the trading store lDuld be ot no 
consequence to the Company. 
The Chicago area had problems with one other independent 
trader by the name of Wallace. Wallace brought a large supply of 
liquor to the area. Stuart warned Kinzie ot his intentions be-
fore his arrival.46 In this way, Kinzie vas well aware ot the 
competition he had to tace. 
Betore the death ot Cratts in September of 1825, the Chicago 
outfit faced another delicate problem with regard to personnel. 
Jean Beaubien, who had originally forced John Cratts to join the 
American Fur Company, had been transferred to Milwaukee after 
1821 so that Crafts oould head the Chioago territory. Beaubien 
was dissatistied with hi. pOSition at Milwaukee whioh was a1read, 
overrun with traders. Stuart was obviousl, following the same 
r 
policy as with the Green Bay traders. Since he did not have full 
confidence in Beaubien's ability, he sent Beaubien less than a 
full complement of goods so that the Company would not lose 
47 
money. Beaubien refused to trade at the less prosperous Mil-
waukee location and, by 1825, was imposing on the Chicago terri-
tory. StuaI·t considered this action in direct opposition to the 
policies of the Company. Thus he showed little sympathy with 
Haaubien'a complaints of his economic prOble11ls.48 
Despite these several problems, the Chicago trade steadily 
advanced under John Crafts's leadership, By 1825, jllst a few 
months before his death, Crafts felt sate in abandoning his pre-
vious wage agreement with the Company for $1000 per year. 
Knowing that the Chicago trade faced bright prospeots, Crafts 
chose to work under a profit-Rharing sCheme.49 Crafts's ideas 
on the fortunes of the Chicago trade were well calculated, 
With the death of John Crafts in September, 1825, a delicate 
problem aroae as to who would succeed as head of the Chicago 
territory. 50 Beaubien's belligerant conduct while Crafts was 
head eliminated him from the post. Gurdon Hubbard, who was head 
of the Illinois Outfit in the interior, was available but not 
oompletely familiar with the personnel in the Chicago area. John 
Kinzie finally emerged as the firat choice ot Robert Stuart. 
John Kinzie possessed two qualities which made him especially 
valuable to the American Fur Co.mpany. Firat, Kinzie was an ex-
r 
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perienced fur trader, a life-long resident within the area, and 
on friendly terms with the Indians. Secondly, Kinzie, was then 
the sub-Indian agent for the Chicago area under Dr. Alexander 
Wolcott. This position not only gave Kinzie a strong conneotion 
with the Indian population, but placed him close to Dr. Wolcott 
who had been definitely unfriendly to the Company in enforcing 
the trade law of 1824. John Kinzie was appointed head of the 
Chicago trade with Jean Beaubien as his as.istant.51 Beaubien's 
assignment as assistant rather than head of the Chicago area was 
occasioned by Stuart's distrust of his ability: 
It is probably that Mr. Beaubien might have 
conducted the whole tolerably well, but as I 
have not full confidence in his capacity for so 
extensive a concern I thought it best to 
associate Mr. Kinzie with him •••• 52 
Stuart made it perfectly clear that Kinzie's decisions would 
take precedence over those of Jean Beaubien.53 Late in 182$, 
Stuart found it necessary to caution Beaubien that his continual 
feuding with John Kinzie had disrupted the conduc' of the trade~4 
The forgotten man in the plans of the American Fur Campany 
for Chicago was Gurdon Hubbard. Although the Chicago outfit ex-
perienced several prosperous years between 1824-27, Hubbard was a 
good example of how the Company prospered while the traders 
floundered. In 182$, Hubbard received $400 per year, but he ex-
55 pected a raise when Crafts died. With the assignment of Kinzie 
to the Chicago post, Hubbard was prepared to leave the Indian 
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trade and take the post of sub-Indian agent which paid $500 per 
year. 56 
Despite these problems, the Chicago outfit realized a con-
57 
siderable profit in the 1824-25 season. There are several 
plausible reasons for Chicago's success. First, the American Fur 
Company held a more effective monopoly over the Chicago trade. 
There vas not an important British influence nor were there Amer-
ican competitors such as at Shanty Town in Green Bay. Further-
more, the population of Chicago was considerably less. In fact, 
Chicago by the best available estimate had less than thirty-five 
inhabitants in 1829. Chicago never had more than 500 inhabitants 
until 1834.58 The lower population of Ohicago also was reflected 
in the number of people engaged in the trade. While the Green 
Bay outfit had as many as twenty-two people utilizing goods worth 
$9,000, Chicago never employed more than nine traders with the 
same amount of goods. 59 Such figures, of course, do not mean 
that individual o traders were more successful. The figures do, 
nevertheless, represent a considerable profit for the Chicago out-
fit and the American Fur Company. 
The economic and social effect of the American Fur Company 
on the early life of Chicago was staggering. While the community 
of Green Bay was composed of several different elements, in-
cluding fur traders, merchants of Shanty Town, and the military; 
Chicago until 1828 was really nothing more than an outpost ot the 
fur trade and the American Fur Company. In 1825, Chicago had 
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thirty-five eligible voters and fourteen tax payers. The total 
property of qhicago was valued at $9,047. The largest segment 
of this property, $$000, was owned by the American Fur Company 
under the name of John Crafts. Thus, the people of Chicago held 
only $4,047 on their own. Further examining the figures, one 
can connect several names as associated with the American Fur 
Company as either clerks or boatmen. Adding their property to 
the power of the American Fur Company, one finds that only $975 
of the total property was in no way, or none that can be traced; 
connected with the American Fur Company.60 
The prosperous trade of the Chicago area did not last long, 
Stuart, rather pleased over the successful tradirlg year in 182$, 
sent John Kinzie an even greater supply of goods for the 1826-27 
61 
season confident that Kinzie could manage the whole affair. 
Stuart's optimism was not justified. In August, 1827, Stuart 
had to report to John Astor that the Chicago outfit had suffered 
a considerable loss. This failure was blamed on the large number 
of credits which Kinzie had not collected.62 Another possible 
explanation was that the Indian annuity pa1Ments upon which the 
Chicago outfit had so heavily depended had been moved a con-
63 
siderable distance from Chicago. Added to these reasons, there 
was the natural depletion of game from the territory. As early 
as 1825, a government officer passing through Chicago had oom-
mented that" ••• the quantity of game in this part of the 
r 
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country is diminishing very rapidly, and ••• it is barely 
n64 sufficient for the support of the Indians. • • 
In 1827, John Kinzie sent his resignation to the American 
Fur Company. 65 This was also the last year the American Fur 
66 
Company sent a large supply or goods to the Chicago area. When 
Kinzie resigned, Gurdon Hubbard also changed the character of his 
trade. Hubbard, in 1825, was one of the rew traders who realized 
the changing character of the frontier. He noticed that soon the 
t,7 
trade with the white population would be of primary importance. ' 
Knowing that Chicago was still a sparsely populated area with a 
diminishing amount of game and Indians, Hubbard in 1827 moved to 
Danville, Illinois. Here he could conduct a brisk trade with the 
greater white population. In 1828, Hubbard sent a special request 
to John Astor in New York to supply goods suitable for trade with 
white settlers. Hubbard could not obtain such goods at Mackinac 
since their stock was still geared to the Indian hunter. In 
addition Robert Stuart objected to the forsaking of the fur trade 
68 
for a retail business. 
Finally, in 1828, Hubbard became a partner in the Company 
69 for the trade of the Illinois River district. The American Fur 
Company reluctantly agreed to furnish him with the necessary 
goods both for trade with the whites and Indians. Hubbard no 
longer wished to trade in the Chicago area. Instead, he bought 
out the Company's rights at Danville and along the Illinois River 
r 
88 
where there was a greater concentration of population. The Com-
pan7lo~reed not to su?ply any other traders in that area if 
H~bbard would assume their outstanding debts amounting to $$00. 70 
With the resignation of John Kinzie and the departure of Gurdon 
Hubbard, Jean Beaubien finally became the chief Chicago trader. 
The American Fur Company now merely supplied traders on an in-
dividual basis. For all intents and purposes, 1828 marked the 
end of a fur trade society in Chicago. The next decade brought 
the Yank.e tmmigration, the Indian'. removal, and land specula-
tion which would gradually transform Chicago into an urban center. 
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CHAPTER VII 
WITHDRAWAL OF TH~ AMERICAN FUR COMPANY, RISE 
OF URBAN COMMUNITIES IN MILWAUKEE, GREEN BAY, AND CHICAGO 
Before 1828, the fur trade had been an important economic 
ingredient of the United States. As the frontier moved westward, 
the abundant trading grounds of the Northwest Territory declined. 
In 1829, a Senate committee investigated the condition of the fur 
trade. Emphasis had been placed on such action because John Astor 
had objected to the government allowing importation of furs duty-
free from foreigb countries. Writing to the committee, Astor 
claimed that his Company was financially destitute: 
I believe I am safe when I say that all our 
Indian traders for these twenty years, witf very 
few exceptions, have been losing time and property 
in that trade • • • • The American Fur Company have 
for the years past, and do no. employ a capital 
of a million dollars. They have not yet been able 1 
to declare a dividend. 
AlthoUFh Astor exaggerated the financial condition ot the 
2 Company which was really doing quite well, he certainly spoke 
the truth concerning the private taaders. I doubt very much, 
however, if their losses were due to foreign competition. Thomas 
Hart Benton, who headed the Senate committee, merely followed 
Astor's viewpoint when he presented the oonclusions of the inves-
tigation. The American fur trade was indeed in a depression, he 
reported, and the principal reason was the inadequate tariff on 
3 foreign furs. 
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Although the fur trade was declining, it still provided the 
principal occupation for the frontier inhabitants. The Chicago 
residents had little else to support their community. In 1821, 
thirteen people within the neighborhood of Chicago were actively 
engaged in the trade. The only significant change in the method 
of the trade was due to the foresight of several American mer-
chants. Oliver Newberry, Brewster, Hayden, and Company, and Peck, 
Walker and Company, although participating in the fur trade, re-
lied more heavily on the exchange of goods for money. Moet of 
these firms operated from Detroit with a small warehouse in 
Chicago.4 
The former employees of the American Fur Company still op-
erated on essentially the same basis. J. Beaubien received small 
shipments of goods to exchange for furs. Bernadus and David 
Laughton located a small post on the Desp1aines River for trade 
with the Potawatomies.5 Since Laughton was expected to collect 
only three to four hundred dollars worth of furs, his trade was 
6 quite small. The Laughtons supplemented their meager harvest 
from the trade by operating a tavern. In 1832, the traders were 
informed that a final large profit could pos.ibly be garnered 
7 
when the Indian TreatY' of 1833 was held in Chi'ago. The 
Laughtons and the American Fur Company realized that with the 




The Indians, although the most essential element in the fur 
trade, were in many respects a deterrent to the settlement of 
this land. Tales of their savagery were spread far and wide. In 
1832, however, the Blackhawk War ended the menace of any Indian 
opposition to the tide of civilization in the Northwest. The 
War not only brought easterners news of the end of the Indian 
treachery. but also the military reports informed them of the 
e fertile lands in the West. The Indian Treaty ot 1833 was the 
final step in opening the gates of the tur trade village ot 
Chicago to a new era. How the settlers Journeying over the Eri. 
Canal, opened since 1825. could take advantage ot the Indian lands 
ceded in 1833. 
The Treaty ot 1833 was the last major accomplishment ot the 
American Fur Company and individual traders in the Chicago area. 
The Treaty purchased land trom the Indians and agreed to pay 
white settlers tor property lost due to the Indian outrages. 
These claims went as far back as the War ot 1812. Many who came 
to Chicago in 1833 wished to advance claims tor propertf sup-
posedly stolen by the Indians, others were land speculators, 
while the majority saw the opportunity to make a tast dollar 
betore their Indian brother departed for lands west of the Miss. 
issippi. 9 The American Fur Company was no exception. W. G. 
Brewster, agent at Detroit, wrote to David Laughton requesting 
him to consult all local traders who wished to present claims at 
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the Treaty. This was done in order that they might give Brewster 
10 the power of attorney to handle their claims. Robert Stuart 
was also at the Treaty to push throu~h the enormous claim of the 
American Fur Company. Individual traders, such as Jacques Vieau 
and 8010!\0. Juneau, arrived to present small claims; but, even 
11 
more importantly, they brought a large supply of goods to trade. 
Interesting, too, was the tact that Governor Cass, Jean Beaubien, 
12 
and Gurdon Hubbard were wirnesses to the Treaty. The spokes-
men tor the Indian tribes were Alexander Robinson and Billy 
Caldwell, both of whom had been closely connected with the fur 
13 
trade and traders since the early 1820'.. Governor Porter, the 
chief government commissioner, was a personal friend of the Kinzie 
family. The Kinzie family eventually drew large grant. from the 
Treaty. Many ot the goods distributed to the Indians by the gOY. 
ernment were purchased from another Kinzie relation, Joseph 
Kercheval. 14 
Despite the predominance of fur trade personnel at the 
Treaty, the most tlagrant violation against government laws and 
the Indian's weltare was the wholesale introduction or liquor. 
In 1832, the government held hearings on the shocking use or 
liquor in trading with the Indians. Eventually these hearings 
resulted in the law or 1832 which introduced a strict regulation 
a~ainst any use or liquor in the Indian trade. IS Yet at the 
Chicago Treaty under the eyes of Governor Porter, Indian agent 
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Owen of Chicago, and numerous local officials the traders plied 
the Indians with -.hiskey to obtain their money. Severa.l ob-
servers of the Treaty described how the Indians were paid in 
fifty-cent pieces. Every item sold by a trader, whether it be a 
16 glass of whiskey or a loaf of bread, cost fifty-cents. The 
manner of conducting the T~eaty of 1833 was hardly a credit to 
the government or the traders. 
The Indians agreed to cede all lands west of I,ake Michigan 
a~ounting to five Million acres. The government agreed to take 
care of any debts levied against the tribes in B.ddi tion to pro-
viding l8.nds west of the MiSSissippi. The second part of the 
treaty enumerated outstanding debts which the Indians owed to the 
white settlers. The American Fur Company drew $17,000, the John 
Kinzie family received $8,000, while Gurdon Hubbard obtained 
nearly $6,000.17 Furthe~ore, the John Kinzie family received 
$25,000 for property lost during the War of 1812.18 
The Treaty ot 1833 met a hostIle reaction in Washington. 
According to records, Governor Porter was charged with granting 
large sums to individual traders, such as Kinzie and Hubbard, 
when these SUMS were actually owed in debts to the American Fur 
19 lompany_ Finally, the government decided to send an agent to 
Chicago to investigate the justice of these claims. 
The most cursory consideration ot the Treaty of 1833 in-
dicated that the American Fur Company received a large payment 
, 
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considerably out of proportion to the damages suffered. Hardly 
a year before this Treaty, Indian afent Owen of Chicago had sent 
a note to Governor Porter claiming that 10s8e8 in the trade due 
to Indian ravages had never amounted to more than a few dollars 
20 in the Chicago area. Then, just a year later, the American Fur 
Company received nearly $17,000 for damages supposedly deriving 
from Indian depredations in the Chicago trade. 
The treaty brought forward another interesting aspect of 
the trade. None of the leading traders who drew payments from 
the Treaty could claim the money as their own. The Kinzie family, 
which had drawn such a large sum, was faced with the debts that 
John Kinzie) Senior had compiled during his early years in the 
fur trade.2l Gurdon Hubbard, who had for many years traded in 
the ChicaFo area, was in debt to the American Fur Company for 
$6,000. Stuart even attempted to stop Hubbard's claim from 
being paid on the grounds that the money rightfully belonged to 
the Company.22 Jean Beaubien, who received nearly $),000 from 
the Treaty of 18)), was eventually forced to p~y $2,000 of this 
2) 
sum to Ramaay Crooks tor debts due to the Company. The Amer-
ican Fur Company not only reoeived a large claim from the Treaty 
but was also able to oolleot the debts ot many former employeea, 
The payments were espeoially significant in a judgment of the 
fur trader's success. The American Fur Company had exploited the 
Chicago area for nearly twenty years, and many times derived 
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large profits. The traders, however, never realized profits. 
Partly through their own oareless finan oia.1 habits and partly 
through the exploitattve policies of the American Fur Company, 
the Chicago tradera, in 1833, had little investment capital as 
Chicago was about to enter a period ot commercial and industrial 
growth. 
Immediately atter the Treaty of 1833, Chicago experienced a 
population boom. The lands oeded to the United States were now' 
opened tor settlement, and new industries and oocupations tollowed 
the population growth. In 1830, there had been a publio land 
sale at Chioago at whioh 126 lots were sold at an average ot $35 
per 10t.24 Five years later, a government land otfioe was opened 
in Chioago,whioh, trom then until 1837, sold approxtmately 588, 
25 104 acres. The population grew trom barely a hundred inhabi-
tants in 1830 to nearly 3500 in 1835.26 Almost as quiokly the 
fur trade~ passed into obsourity. Lend sales were oontrolled by 
27 
eastern speculators and town promoters. The fur trader knew 
little about the urban complex springing up about him. John 
Kinzie, Jr., when he went to file preemption olaims tor the land 
his father had settled, tailed to claim all the land that wal 
rightfully his. In his own words, Kinzie was happy with just 
28 
enough land to live on. Gurdon Hubbard proved to be one of the 
rew traders who aotually benetited from or oontributed to the 
urban growth of Chicago. In 1835, Hubbard invested in land speou-
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latlon. He sold land ror $80,000, which earlier had cost him 
only $5,000. 29 The new city now under the inrluence of spec-
ulators began new industries, agitated tor harbor improvement to 
increase lake commerce, and drove to complete the Illinois-
Michigan Canal. 30 All such moves were designed to incresse the 
rate of commercial growth. Chicago, indeed, had bridged the gap 
between fur trade village and urban center. The people who in-
itiated such changes were not even residents of the city two years 
before. The capital employed was derived trom land sales, 
eastern banks, and government internal improvement schemes. Ille 
fur trader passed out ot Chicago history. A few, such as the 
descendants ot John Kinzie and Jean Beaubien, bridged the trans-
i tion b,. opening hotels and taverns ,. These were the exceptionu, 
nevertheless. The fur traders rarely emerged as leaders of the 
community. The actual course whioh the traders followed was not 
clear because their names were not involved with the business ot 
the new cit,.. Many remained in Chicago while others moved west-
ward where their skills were stIll required. 
During the land boom in Chicago, the American Fur Company 
also experienced a period of transition. John J •. Astor sold his 
interest in 1834. The Company was immediately reorganized under 
Ramsay Crooks. The Company had little part in the emerging city 
of Chicago. Because the traders liquidated their debts to the 
Company through the Treaty of 1833, the Americe.n Fur Company did 
not own or have claim to any land in the Chicago area. Since 
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Crooks pursued a policy apainst selling goods to the white set-
31 
tlers, he concluded all arrangements with Chicago in 1835 by 
32 
selling the Oompany's buildings and property to Jean Beaubien. 
Milwaukee's rise as an urban community also began after the 
Treaty .of 1833 when its lands were made available for sale to 
the public. Milwaukee had not been an integral part ot the fur 
trade because it had merely been an occasional fur trading area. 
As late as 1833, Milwaukee had no permanent residents. Both 
Solomon Juneau and Jacques Vieau merely traded there during the 
winter. There were no lands under cultivation or even claimed.33 
Apparently, Juneau was totally oblivious to the area's potential. 
Through the reports of Major S. O. Stambaugh, the government's 
commissioner to deal with the Menominees, the Milwaukee region 
was extolled as fertile farming country and a possible lake 
harbor. 34 The old traders of the Milwaukee region, however, knew 
little of farming or lake commerce. The more speculative eastern 
immigrants were aware of the possibilities of the Milwaukee site. 
As early as 1833, Morgan L. Martin, an enterprising frontier 
35 
lawyer, thought that'Bilwaukee would make an excellent lake port. 
Martin forced Solomon Juneau to be a town builder and speculator. 
He formed a partnership with Juneau, buying half his lake frontage 
36 
and agreeing to push through the pre-emption claims to the land. 
Juneau would not have exploited Milwaukee's possibilities without 
the skillful prodding of Morgan L. Martin. 
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Even it Juneau had refused to cooperate with Martin, the 
MilwaUkee area was sought by other promoters. Byron Kilbourn, 
who conducted the government's survey of the land, was so im-
pressed that he bought tracts ot land in Milwaukee. 37 
While men such as Kilbourn and Morgan L. Martin were pro-
moting town development in Milwaukee, the men who had traded there 
tor nearly twenty years remained unaware ot the changes. Juneau 
persisted in oonducting a faltering Indian trade until 1835. 
Crooks had reluctantly oonsented to his supplying white settlers, 
but clearly indioated that it was only a temporary oondition. 
By 1836, Crooks had withdrawn trom the trade as he had done in 
Chicago; and Solomon Juneau, through the goodness ot Morgan L. 
Martin, became an important figure in the later growth ot 
Milwaukee. By 18)6, Juneau was building a tavern, improving the 
)8 
streets, and erecting a court house. Finally, in 18)7, Solomon 
Juneau became the mator of Milwaukee. Without the prodding and 
investment capital ot Morgan L. Martin, however, Juneau would 
have remained a frontier trader. 
The sucoess of the speoulative and enterprising sohemes ot 
Martin and Kilbourn was assured in 1837. The tirst publio neeting 
in Milwaukee (now a oity ot 700 residents) disoussed the improve-
ments needed to assure it the status ot a oommeroial center; 
suitable roads, oanal oonnections with the Mississippi, and harbor 
improvements. 39 Once again the pattern was clear. Milwaukee was 
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raised from a fur trade village to a commercial depot not by fur 
traders, but by two enterprising speculators. The fur trader had 
little relation to the city of Milwaukee. 
Green Bay followed a different line of development. The fur 
trade had proved unprofitable as early as 1826, and the American 
element already had begun its town-building. Yet Crooks and the 
American Pur Company still chose to supply the Green Bay traders 
with a small stock of gOOds.40 The traders continued to sink into 
debt, and the American Fur Company again wished to lay claim to 
their private land holdings to liquidate the debt.41 
In 1831, a treaty with the Menominee Indians ~as signed 
which opened large tracts of land around Green Bay to settlement. 
John Lawe filled large pre-emption claims, but most other Green 
Bay residents only claimed the land on which they resided.42 As 
was true in Chicago, the speculators developed the land and de-
termined the character of the new city. By 18)2, Daniel Whitney 
had laid out the town of Navarino about two miles south of the 
43 
old Shanty Town. Gradually, Navarino attracted the new settlers. 
The fur traders opposed these developments. They had not re-
alized the value of their lands or the character of an urban 
society, and n • • • it was not until the arrival of more enter-
pristng and grasping settlers, the keen and speculating Americana 
(a class feared and hated by the former class (the fur traders»), 
that these olaims were considered of any value, or worth the 
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trouble and expense of obtaining titles to them."44 
The American Fur Company played a major role in the later 
settlement of Green Bay. Never was the power of the Company ao 
manifest and the poverty of the traders so terribly apparent than 
in the final accounting of the Green Bay fur trade. In l8~, 
when John Astor decided to retire from the Company, the Green 
Bay traders were again faced with the task ot liquidat1ngtheir 
debts. Since the traders did not possess any capital, the Ameri-
can Fur Company asked tor their lands. James D. Doty was a~lhi:"-"· 
pointed attorney tor the Company to settle accounta with the 
traders.45 To clear the debts, lands belonging to the Grignons, 
46 Lawe, and Porlier were transferred to the Company. Doty, how-
ever, argued that John Lawe should be allowed to retain much of 
his land. There were two reasons for this suggestion. John Lawe 
had been the first trader to acknowledge his debt_ thus in-
fluencing the other traders to do the same. Secondly, Lawe's 
long service to the Company necessitated a lenient policy es-
47 pecially since public opinion could turn against the Company. 
Astor agreed to this plan allowing Lawe to retain certain plots 
48 
of land; but, 1n the legal agreement, Lawe was remindea that 
he still owed the Company more than $8000 1n cash.49 
There was good reason for Astor and Crooks to worry about 
public opinion toward the American Pur Company in Green Bay. 
Rather than withdraw entirely from Green Bay, the Company decided 
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to keep the lands obtained and indulge in town-building. In 
1835, the town of Astor was plotted upon the lands formerly owned 
by Lawe and the Grignons. A contemporary resident described the 
conditions that led to the plo~ting of Astor: 
• • • The land was originally owned by John 
Lawe and the Grigpon family_ Together with 
other real estate, it was taken in payment of 
balance due tpe old Green Bay Company to the 
former Company; the debt having accrued by loss 
in the Indian trade for in this business, it 
generally happened that the small traders who 
purchased their goods at high prices after years 
of toil and privation spent in the trade, came 
out with nothing ••• leaving to the great 
monopoly, the lion's share of the profits. 
The consideration received by the former owners 
was trifling compared with the present value ot 50 
the property. . 
Astor's city was built in direct opposition to Navarino 
owned by Daniel Whitney. The rivalry between these two areas 
slowed the economic development of the region. Finally, in 1838, 
the two villages were Joined:',in the city of Green Bay. By 1835, 
though, the transition was complete. One historian ot Green Bay 
accurately described the change: 
By 1835, many of the old colonial custOMS had 
passed awa,y; the village had lost somethine of 
its primitive social character •••• The 
French inhabitants, never aggressive, retired 
more and more within their own circle and 
nationality while a more prime and Bober class 
of Americans were filling the vacant places, and 
stamping their influence on the manners and CU8tO~S 
of the settlement~ 51 
Unable to adapt to the new civilization, Lawe and a few 
other traders continued to exploit the Indian trade. Lawe was 
r 
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still losing money, however, by depending on the Indian trade. 
Yet Cx-ooks absolutely forbade his trading with white se.ttlers 
unless the sale was for cash. Lawe disregsrded Crook*'s in.struc-
tions; and, in 1835, he presented a list of $1000 in debts owed 
by the white residents. Crooks admonished Lawe for this uractice 
saying " • • • you certainly lose more by bad debts, and you have 
always done so, than you can possibly gain by the good ones, and 
if you did not sell a dollar's worth at all to the whites, you 
would be better orr." Furthermore, Crooks instructed Lawe to stop 
all sales to white settlers. Lave's many friends had pre8sured 
him into selling goods on credIt. Rather than disappoint these 
people, Lawe sold goods with the risk ot never obtaining the 
money. To forestall any further sales, Crooks relieved Lawe ot 
the public pressure by informing the people that he did not trust 
their credit.52 
In 1636, Crooks again agreed to supply Lawe with goods tor 
the trade, yet it was clearly iridicated that this was the final 
year.53 As in Chicago, Crooks awaited the payments designated 
by the Treaty of 1836 with the· Menominee. He even made a special 
journey to Green Bay since he wa. 
the more anxious to go bec8.use my presencII Blust 
be valuable to our interests ~t Green Bay when 
the payments are made under the Menominee Treaty, 
when Mr. Lawe and his associates will receive a 
pretty large SUM, and if lett to themselves, they 
may preter buying goods tor the coming season's 54 
trade to paying what they owe the lompany. 
103 
Because John Lawe had criticized the Amerioan Fur Company's 
business praotices, Ramsay Crooks teared Lawe might use theae 
55 co~plalnts as a pretext for not paying his debts, Lawe was 
particularly belligerent, for he felt that the COl'l1pany was closing 
his outfit merely to arrange a contract with some other trader. 
Crooks, however, explained to him that the Green Bay area was 
being closed entirely. The five per-cent commiss1.on charged on 
the goods, Crooks claimed, hardly reimbursed the Company for the 
eftort. The only reason the American Fur Com.pany had oontinued 
to send goods to Green Bay, Crooks pointed out, was the triend-
56 
ship they held for John Lawe. 
In 1837, the total debts of the Green Bay traders still 
amounted to the staggering sum of $27,000.57 To be sssured that 
he would receive a considerable sum tram the Indian Treaty, Lawe 
58 j ourn.eyed to Washington where the tinal pa1D1ents were arranged. 
From the Menominee Treaty of 1836, John Lawe received $12,000, 
59 Augustin Grignon gained $10,000, and Porlier received $7,000. 
Furthermore, the American Fur Company collected nearly $7,000 in 
60 
Lawe's name from the Treatr with the Winnebagoes and tho Sioux. 
Aa late as 1839, John Lave received small shipments of goods 
trom the Amerioan Fur Company_ He could not abandon the only 
occupation that he knew. Crooks continued to supply his needs, 
but he stated that 
We would preter to close all our affairs in your 
quarter, and ahall be pleased to hear that fOU 
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have made better arrangements for your own 
interest, than those that have recently ex-
isted between us, for we have only continued 
under the impression that it was for the ad-
vantage and convenience of an old and muoh 
•• tee.ed friend, not for the sa~e of the profit 
the business gave us. 61 
Green Bar had entered a period of urban growth. The fur 
traders, like John Lawe and the Grignons, remained in Green Bay; 
but ~hey were not an integral toroe in the life ot the city. 
The fur trade society had now come full circle. In the 
initial stages, the American Fur Oompany had been the economic 
basis of the Northwest Territory •. In the formation ot its monop-
011', the Company harassed local government otficials, contribute.d, 
to the downfall of the factory system, and made the previously 
independent trader a tool of a business enterprise. Through the 
lioensing problem ot the Green Bay traders from 1816 to 1819, 
the oompetition with the taotory system from 1816 to 1822, the 
prio. wars with independett traders, and the finanoing of the 
Green Bay and Chicago outfits from 1816 to 1835 the busin.s. 
operation. a~ policies of the Company were most clearly evident. 
~ 
What,was the total effect ot the changing frontier sooiety' 
What were the contributions ot the traders' Ia terms ot tangible 
reali ties, the fur trade society contributed 11 ttle. ,to ~'l.. urban 
community. The romantic ,description ot the tur traders as the 
original architects of roads and water connections certafnly 
holds 80me truth, but their contribution in terms ot investment 
r 
capital for commercial enterprise. or leadership tor political 
and social lite was indeed slight. This was not alone the tault 
of the tur trader~ The traders, like the Indians, were never 
really considered during the process of change. Antipathy was 
created between the fur trader and the government at the very 
out.et of the transitional period. The factory system, the pre • 
• enoe ot the military. and the changing laws in regards to 
citizenship made the trader seriously question his place in the 
new society. 
Then ag"_$,!l_, the American Fur Compalll, WIlS ,!:>otll tl>:~ .. h:arl>1.ng~t:r 
ot Am~r1dan individualism and the ruin of the tur trade societr. 
_. --'- .-.- '~'-"'.-'-"" - "". .. ,- . 
Turner's concept ot democracr and the necessity ot individualism 
on the frontier was really not operative between 1815-1834. The 
traders were part of a great monopoll. They were forced, as in 
the Green Bay Company, to buy'and sell the goods ot the American 
Fur Company. Atter 1815. there was hardly a succ •. ss~llnde-
-.----~-~.~-... 
Pft_ruie~-trader .. 1n._~~e terrltQrl. As 1$6 years progressed and 
the 8bicago and Green Bay outtits t611 deeper into debt, their 
property came under the control ot thH Company. When the sudden 
change, occasioned bl the sale of public lands, began in the 
18)O's, the traders in Green Bay and Chicago lacked both the land 
and the capital to invest in urban development. Ramsay Crooks's 
refusal to allow John Lawe or any of. the traders to' convert their 
trade to a merchandise business with the white peptlers pr~vent~d 
r 
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the possibility that the traders might adapt to the new economic 
conditions of the frontier. Without land or capital, the fur 
trader passed into obscurity. The fur traders did, however, 
sustain the frontier communities until immigrants from the East 
arrived with the necessary professional knowledge, technical 
skill, and investment capital to complete the transition to an 
urban society. The fur trade and traders were indeed a stage in 
the westward move.ent. 
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